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ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to critically assess an alternative approach to reintegrating ex-combatants 
into the Local Economic Development (LED) process, using the experiences of other African 
countries. It also offers practitioners guidance on how planners might successfully address 
the challenges of reintegration within the context of a Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) programmes. The study unpacks the role of Public Works Projects in a 
post-war torn society for this purpose. The strength of Public Works Projects in a post-
conflict society lies on the fact that these projects aim to provide rapid and visible relief for 
the reintegration of ex-combatants and/or other socially marginalised people into civil 
society. Public Works Projects build the capacity of communities for development, keeping 
the marginalised members productive and self-reliant in the new society in which they find 
themselves.  
Using the case study of Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), this study is 
premised on the assumption that the planning of the reintegration of Kivu’s ex-combatants 
needs to focus on the an overall systems framework, whereby all the segments play a crucial 
and equal role and where all the issues of LED through Public Works Projects are regarded 
as dynamic and treated as interconnected. Experience from Sub-Saharan African countries 
show that the reintegration of ex-combatants is a means towards sustainable peace and LED 
enhancement in a post-conflict society since it allows external and national partners to 
invest, through Public Works Projects, in rebuilding developmental infrastructure in a post-
conflict society. Planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants in a society, therefore, 
assumed a multifaceted approach. Within the context of this research, this new form of 
planning for the economic reintegration of ex-combatants has the potential of lasting longer 
and requiring more funding than the ex-combatants’ reintegration programme as it exists 
currently in Kivu. It urgently needs more dedicated resources in the form of Public Works 
Projects to prevent a relapse of conflict. The reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu (DRC) 
confirms the fragile and complex nature of the DDR programme and speaks of the need to 
reassess the role of Public Works Projects in post-conflict reconstruction.  
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Field visits, extensive readings on Kivu and interviews with conflict analysts and residents of 
the DRC’s conflict-tensed regions have revealed that Kivu will not improve without a holistic 
approach to LED planning through Public Works Projects and systemic thinking. Planning 
for the reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu’s post-war torn society will, therefore, have 
some priorities, that is: a reintegration program drawn from the experiences of other post-
conflict countries as well as a good understanding of local and international policies and the 
involvement of Public Works Projects. These priorities will re-orientate the existing 
theoretical and methodological processes of planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants 
in a post-conflict-society. Based on the analysis of Kivu’s recent reintegration programme, 
and following the readings of the shortcomings of United Nations Organization in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), soon to be United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) as of 1st July 2010, 
and the National Commission for Disarmament and Reintegration (CONADER), in this study 
a good understanding of local and international policies and the involvement of Public 
Works Projects will serve as recommendations for prospective African Union (AU) and 
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.   
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CHAPTER 1:  
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND EX-COMBATANTS’ 
REINTEGRATION 
1.1. Introduction 
Several Sub-Saharan African countries have made major strides in institutionalising the 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. This remarkable 
turnaround has provided a glimmer of hope and created opportunities for not only sustainable 
peace, but also the enhancement of the Local Economic Development. However, the 
management of the DDR of ex-combatants remains a very complex process due to the lack of 
a standardized DDR method to be applied to all countries (Kingma, 1997). To address this 
challenge, post-conflict countries have used Public Works Projects as a post-conflict 
developmental framework which enables a rapid and balanced reconstruction of a post-
conflict economy (Colletta et al, 1996). This research flashes light to the challenges 
surrounding the reintegration programme as it occurred in the Kivu.  Acknowledging the 
difference and variation in the shaping of the reintegration framework, as each case of DDR 
involves a distinct political, social and economic context, both post-conflict states and 
international agencies agree upon the fact that the success of the reintegration programmes 
relies on the framing of a strategic planning for the post-conflict local economic development 
through Public Works Projects (GTZ. 2005). 
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  1.2. Context of the Study: Kivu, DRC 
Figure 1: The DRC map 
        
 
Source: www.flickr.com/photos/pietclement/ 
This study looks at Kivu province in the Eastern quadrant of the DRC. The Great Kivu 
Region is divided into three provinces namely: North-Kivu, South- Kivu and Maniema which 
are the power houses for agriculture and mineral resources (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001). 
Many devastating conflicts, having been launched from neighboring countries, have persisted 
for over 15 years. It is important to note that the outbreak of conflicts in Kivu has led to the 
disruption and destruction of much of the physical infrastructure in the province as well as 
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the decline of social and human capital in a way that is too complex to quantify (Colletta, 
1997). Armed conflict in Kivu is the root of recurrent presence of ex-combatants into the 
province, and is unquestionably seen as one of the main causes, among several, of why 
millions of people in the DRC are living in poverty (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001; Speaker, 
2008). The region holds the record for the most conflicts and has incurred the most casualties 
of all the post-cold war conflicts in the DRC with an estimated 150,000 ex-combatants, of 
whom 33,000 were estimated to be under 18 years old of age (Speaker, 2008). In the 2003, a 
peace agreement in which all warring parties took part aimed at achieving national unity and 
the reintegration of ex-combatants. Since, the country has embarked on a post-conflict 
reconstruction programme based on key priorities namely: infrastructure, economy recovery, 
ex-combatants’ reintegration and community reconciliation.  
1.3. Problem Statement 
Despite the existence of an internationally agreed upon legal framework towards DDR 
programmes, there are formidable challenges in designing and implementing DDR processes 
that successfully address the specific needs of ex-combatants in post-conflict peace- building 
situations. There has been significant progress in the second half of the twentieth century in 
stabling norms and standards for DDR as part of peace building. Yet, despite of the 
significant progress made in establishing the norms and standards, there remain shortcomings 
in the actual practice of implementing DDR of ex-combatants so that there is a positive 
impact on the ground for achieving sustainable development (Colletta et al., 1996; Anderlini 
and Pampell Conaway, 2004). For instance, despite the appeals found in the UN report, the 
reality is that the needs of ex-combatants are often not addressed in the initial DDR process 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1994; 1995). The reality is that the needs of ex-combatants are often not 
addressed in the initial DDR process, leaving them vulnerable. It is argued that ex-
combatants often find the return to civilian life difficult. As Anderlini and Pampell Conaway 
(2004) remark economic reintegration blind or insensitive exacerbates the difficulties 
encountered by ex-combatants in this transition. There is also justified concern that even 
when ex-combatants participate or are included in formal reintegration planning, their role 
can be limited to a formal presence without having the capacity, or mandate to contribute to 
setting or shaping the agenda of such planning. Hence, there is still much work to do to make 
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ex-combatants’ economic reintegration a reality. To leave ex-combatants out of reintegration 
programmes is not only a violation of their right to participate but also undermines the 
objectives of the DDR programme. The reintegration of ex-combatants is critical towards 
achieving their human development security and a steady job recovery process as part of 
post-conflict local economic development (Colletta et al., 1996).  
The most important functions of DDR is arguably the provision of training and support for 
ex-combatants to help them understand the way their society has changed as a result of 
conflict and how they might reintegrate into post-conflict social, economic and political 
structures (Ibid). In contemporary DDR, it is important to emphasise on ex-combatants as 
war affected persons, social agents of change, and beneficiaries of assistance. In Kivu, ex-
combatants were active agents in armed conflict either as combatants or as service providers 
(Anderlini and Pampell Conaway 2004). The efforts to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate ex-
combatants in Kivu have not succeeded. The reintegration programe in the DRC highlighted 
that although the DDR programme took place in Kivu, some 10,000 ex-combatants are still 
waiting to be reintegrated and their rights are overlooked, despite their involvement in armed 
groups and ostensible consideration in the text of the Lusaka and Pretoria Accords. Kivu’s 
reintegration programme was poorly planned and framed due to a continuous flow of cheap 
small arms into the region. As Takhur (2008) explains, the most significant challenges of a 
weak and non strategic reintegration programmes in Kivu lie in ex-combatants frequently 
posing a danger to post-war security; the atrocities committed by ex-combatants lead to 
severe tensions with civilians who have suffered at their hands. Furthermore certain groups of 
weak and marginalized ex-combatants need special assistance for humanitarian reasons -This 
was evident in Kivu where DDR programmes traditionally operated with the narrow 
objective to disarm ex-combatants with guns. It generally failed to account for the fact that 
reintegration is a long-term economic recovery process, therefore a way towards a sustainable 
local economic development (Oxfam, 2008).  
In its initial phases, the Kivu’s DDR programmes had a one-combatant, one-gun and $ US 
100 eligibility policy; every ex-combatant with a weapon was invited to turn it in, in order to 
participate in the process and earn $ US 100. Hence, the UN‘s definition of combatant 
excluded those who did not have weapons to turn in such as: the ex-combatants who had 
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served in the armed factions as nurses, cooks and sex workers or slaves. Thus, Kivu’s DDR 
programme has failed to incorporate an economic perspective based on the post-conflict’s 
economy recovery as the programmes relied on one-combatant, one-gun theories and 
conceptualizations of the war-to-peace transition (Takhur, 2008). This has had significant 
implications on ex-combatants’ lives in post-conflict societies in general. Considering the 
position of ex-combatants in the post-conflict, Chigunta (2006) asserts:  
Given that ex-combatants face challenges such as social exclusion, lack of skills, 
unemployment, diseases, amputation, etc which particularly victimised them during the post-
conflict reconstruction, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potential in 
formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development 
programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical 
reconstruction of the local economy recovery. Accordingly, the problem is that despite the 
good intention of MONUSCO/MONUC and CONADER to implement DDR programmes in 
Kivu, the planning of DDR programmes aimed at ex-combatants was weak, not strategic and 
ended up overlooking ex-combatants’ economic recovery. Hence this research can argue that 
one reason for this was that the aim of DDR was to achieve political stability and security 
(Takhur, 2008) and this is why there was a gap. In Kivu, it was found that the exclusion of 
economic perspective from the DDR programmes was due to the implementation and 
development of weak reintegration planning, which was not strategic which failed to include 
local developmental projects as a way towards a sustainable local economic 
development(ISS, 2007).  
1.4. Research Question 
From the previous discussion, one can see that the main problem is that the Kivu’s 
reintegration programmes formulated were weak, not very strategic and failed to include the 
economic perspective of the post-conflict society. The main question that is asked in this 
research therefore is: 
What  other  courses  of  action  can  be  taken  to  have  a  strong  and  reliable  reintegration 
programme for Kivu province? 
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To engage fully with the task at the hand, some subsidiary questions will be posed and there 
are formulated as follows:  
  How can re-skilling/training be used through Public Works Programmes to integrate 
ex-combatants and boost LED in the Kivu? 
 How can the reintegration programme be strengthened and made more strategic for 
the purpose of LED? 
 How can micro-enterprises be used towards ex-combatants’ economic reintegration?  
 What is the successful vehicle for carrying out what is needed? 
1.5. Research Method 
This research is a case study based on empirical method. The empirical method gauges 
selected lessons learned from the review of relevant publications and articles on reintegration 
programmes. This analysis is based on a literature review of secondary sources covering the 
subject areas of reintegration programmes. In addition, internet research was used to gather 
specific information on AU, UN, INGO, NGOs initiatives and working papers, evaluations 
and policy documents. The study utilized the qualitative case study method. Comprehensive 
desk secondary data research on the reintegration of ex-combatants in the Kivu was carried 
out.  
Given the breadth of the literature, the study focuses on that which is most relevant to the 
current discussion. The diversity of sources enables a more comprehensive grasp of the link 
between reintegration programmes, Public Works Projects and LED. Much of this literature 
is qualitatively focused, although there is some information about the numbers of ex-
combatants who have participated in the reintegration programme. This literature was helpful 
to determine the history and evolution of ex-combatants’ reintegration. Evidence about the 
number of ex-combatants in Kivu was sought from the qualitative information. This is 
important because of the literary wealth of information that already exists about DDR as well 
as a lack of access to primary materials in the researcher‘s present location as regards DDR 
will provide sufficiently for this aim.  
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1.6. Rationale of the Study 
This study offers practitioners guidance on how planners might successfully address the 
challenges of reintegration within the context of a DDR programme. Looking at state owned 
CONADER and external partners MONUC/MONUSCO, NGOs and INGOs to address the 
re-integration process for the purpose of LED will shed light on how government and 
external sector partnership in Public Works Projects can play a role in the DDR process. This 
piece of work also intends to explore the reintegration process as a socio-economic problem 
involving the participation of the whole community in the Kivu. In addition, it strives to 
report on how CONADER, MONUC/MONUSCO, NGOs and INGOs may effectively 
address the reintegration process which aims to afford Kivu’s ex-combatants skills and 
marketable opportunities for the reconstruction of their households, livelihoods and also 
assist local economic development (Watson, 2009). 
Reintegration is both a social and economic process with an open time frame (Hillier and 
Healey, 2008). The main components of reintegration programmes often include: the 
formulation of national policy; support to regional implementation agencies; local level 
emergency aid; socio-economic profiling; transport to selected resettlement regions; 
discharge payments; reinsertion packages, reconstruction projects, vocational training and 
employment promotion (Kotzé and Hussein, 2008). The extent of local private sector 
involvement in each of these components can vary considerably according to local post-
conflict capacities. Nonetheless, reconstruction projects, employment promotion, vocational 
training and poverty alleviation are the areas which usually witness the greatest level of 
private sector participation.   
The dominant approach to reintegration is that of a ‘continuum’ of interventions, moving 
from emergency relief activities to reconstruction and ultimately to development (Kotzé and 
Hussein, 2008).  Reintegration programmes are often implemented through large-scale 
cooperation among donor agencies, national and international non-government organisations 
and host governments (Colletta et al., 1996). Colletta (1996) points out that cooperation may 
be organised through Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals by the United Nations and/or 
through initiatives under the Post-Conflict Fund of the World Bank. For her, resources from a 
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wide array of donors may be pooled and the specific technical expertise of organisations such 
as UNHCR, ILO and GTZ may be co-ordinated under the umbrella of national programmes 
(Ibid). Experience in several settings has led to the emergence of best practices for conflict-
sensitive approaches to reintegration. These include: Tailoring interventions in response to 
the detailed socio-economic needs assessments of ex-combatants and receiving communities; 
Building upon the existing self-help livelihood strategies of local communities; Building 
participation, transparency and accountability in the design, implementation and evaluation of 
programmes; Building capacity of government to assume long-term responsibility of LED 
processes (Kotzé and Hussein, 2008).  
Economic reintegration comes jointly with LED strategy’s which emphasises links between 
community needs for infrastructure rehabilitation and employment promotion for ex-
combatants, referral services for employment opportunities, access to micro-enterprise 
support schemes, building a consensus around development issues, restoring basic services in 
areas such as health, education and housing, and reactivating the local economy (Hillier and 
Healey, 2008). The provision for the basic needs of ex-combatants is vital in terms of poverty 
alleviation and LED. If the basic needs of ex-combatants are provided for, they will be more 
productive and economic growth will be stimulated.  Economic reintegration is a strategy to 
fight for the plight of ex-combatants and reduce unemployment directly but it also has other 
indirect benefits for human development on a local level (Kotzé and Hussein, 2008). 
Reintegration programmes include the creation of jobs by attracting new business; achieve 
local economic stability and a diverse economy.  
At this stage, the relationship between reintegration and planning is identified. The 
reintegration approach aims at employment creation and income generation through an 
optimal use of human (ex-combatants) and other resources in a determined geographical 
economic area. Ex-combatants traditionally excluded from economic development processes 
are given the opportunity to participate in the planning and the design of interventions 
through economic reintegration. This involved the establishment of LED Agencies as bottom-
up participatory instruments to build consensus, tackle threats and exploit economic 
opportunities. Particular emphasis is placed on strengthening the capacity of local 
stakeholders to articulate their interests, plan and organize initiatives, and to link the local 
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economy with national and global economies (Hillier and Healey, 2008). The overall 
approach placed equal weighting on the process and output. In other words, broad 
participation is considered as essential for sustainable LED. However, the crucial point to be 
borne in mind when planning for ex-combatants’ reintegration is not to know in order to 
decide, but to decide in order to be able to know (Archibugi, 2003). This traditional idea 
needs positive analysis to be able to make a decision which brings an explicit normative 
orientation that makes positive analysis possible and meaningful (ibid). 
1.7. Research Framework 
This report probes into Kivu’s ex-combatants reintegration. It provides understanding of ex-
combatants’ reintegration, first by examining the economic role of reintegration in post-
conflict situations, then by analysing the applicability of ex-combatants and other 
developmental contexts. Looking at the experiences of other African post-conflict societies, 
the literature shows that most of Sub-Saharan African reintegration programmes were carried 
through Public Works Projects to retrain and re-skill ex-combatants. These programmes were 
drawn on the country’s capacity to raise national scarce resources and ability to utilize them 
sparingly. The Ethiopian reintegration programme, for example, was based on vocational 
training, formal education and life skills education to re-skill ex-combatants. This programme 
has assisted returnees to be marketable and competitive on the job market. Through Public 
Works Projects, Ethiopian veterans have been able to find decent jobs tailored to their skills 
that contribute to the development of their local economy (Muggah, 2008). In Angola, 
however, the national government has set a special ex-combatants department which works 
inextricably with the department of the Public Works. These two departments aim at 
providing skills, training and empowering former fighters in initiating development projects 
in which ex-combatants utilize their new skills to become economically self-reliant (Mashike, 
2000). In South Africa the Expanded Public Works Projects implemented through a 
reintegrated plan have been effective in training and empowering marginalized people in 
search of marketable and employable skills (Colletta et al. 1996; Anderlini and Pampell 
Conaway, 2004). Therefore, this research will draw upon the African reintegration 
frameworks as they occurred in Sub-Saharan African post-conflict countries.  
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1.8. The Structure of the Research 
The first chapter introduces the research and discusses the aim, research question and the 
method to be used. The second chapter focuses on the post-conflict’s review, arguing for a 
contextualized approach which takes cognizance of the reintegration of ex-combatants and 
how the process interacts with LED through Public Works Projects. The third chapter 
introduces LED in a post-conflict society. It emphasizes the need for decentralization and 
public and private partnership in mega-projects. The chapter provides an assessment of post-
conflict review as a cross-referencing to guide forward the debates surrounding Sub-Saharan 
African reintegration programmes. The fourth chapter examines ex-combatants’ economic 
reintegration. It portrays different scenarios for economic reintegration of ex-combatants 
through Public Works Projects. The fifth chapter engages a discussion between the 
international review and the reintegration programme as it occurred in Kivu. Finally, the sixth 
chapter looks at the way into the future, suggesting a planning response for ex-combatants’ 
reintegration as a way forward for Kivu.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY’S REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Although Angola and Namibia have experienced civil war before 1990s, over the past 
nineteen years, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, the Sub-
Saharan African region has become a region of unrest. Civil wars inherited from failed or 
collapsed states left behind a heavy social bill that continues to have a negative impact to 
African post-conflict countries (Hassan, 2001). African civil wars have involved several 
nations. There have been a number of complex reasons, including conflicts over basic 
resources such as water, access and control over rich minerals and other resources and 
various political agendas (Colletta et al., 1996). This has been fueled and supported by 
various national and international corporations and other regimes which have interests in the 
outcome of the conflicts. At the end of a conflict, there are distinctive challenges among 
which is the spread of ex-combatants into civilian society, economic disruption, economic 
recovery and reduction of the risk of recurring conflict which emerge as social challenges to 
overcome.   
Too often the need for the reintegration of ex-combatants, skills development and job 
creation projects after a serious conflict go unrecognized and unmet. This chapter will look at 
the understanding of the concept of ex-combatants and defines some concepts which relate to 
the demilitarization of ex-combatants and their transition to civilian life, namely: 
disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration, followed by the understanding of 
the post-conflict challenges. The chapter will then link both the reintegration of ex-
combatants and the uplifting of local economic development through Public Works Projects 
in a post-conflict situation.  A key focus is the array of issues and challenges that must be 
worked out in order to permit a smooth rebuilding of a post-conflict society and its resultant 
lack of job opportunities to a situation of stable, long-term employment capable of supporting 
a decent livelihood. 
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2.2. The Understanding of the Meaning of an Ex-combatant 
The United Nations defines an ex-combatant as a former soldier who has been registered and 
disarmed from a military service (UN, 1999). However, this definition does not clearly 
explain who should be recognized as a fighter or combatant. Lindsey (2005) attempts to draw 
up a useful list of factors that contribute to the understanding of the concept by proposing that 
an ex-combatant is a member of national armed force, where there exists an identifiable 
organization, a clear command structure and an internal disciplinary system. 
In an armed conflict wherein different states are engaged, as was the case in the DRC, 
Lindsey’s (2005) definition is not applicable due to the fact that many rebel groups and 
paramilitary forces lack both a clear command structure and organization (Lindsey, 2005). 
Hence, Stedman (2002) suggests broadening the meaning of ex-combatant in the international 
conventional discourse as the demilitarization of individuals who have served a warring party 
(Stedman, 2002). An ex-combatant is then an individual who has taken direct part in the 
hostilities on behalf of one of the warring parties and has been registered and disarmed 
(Stedman, 2002; Nilsson, 2005). 
This definition is based on combatants who are identified from the official DDR processes. It 
ignores many other fighters who have participated fully in the conflict but have not been 
identified and demobilized by the official structures (Coulter, 2004). Hence, from these 
definitions, an ex-combatant is any person who has been part of an armed group in a support 
capacity and may therefore include messengers, porters, cooks, spies, cleaners, bodyguards, 
sex slaves etc. This latter definition incorporates ex-militias, ex-fighters, former soldiers and 
ex-guerrillas. For the purpose of this research these terms are used interchangeably, denoting 
anybody who legally or illegally took part in an armed group.  
Having understood the different meanings of ex-combatants, it is important to understand 
how they get demilitarized and involved with civilian life. This issue will be discussed in the 
next section which relates to disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration. 
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2.2.1. The Demilitarization of Ex-combatants 
Demilitarization is a process through which an ex-combatant is disarmed, demobilized, 
reinserted and reintegrated. Reintegration as a final stage of former soldiers’ demilitarization 
is tied greatly to national economic reconstruction. Disarmament is a post-conflict process the 
purpose of which is to collect arms and military objects used during the conflict period (UN, 
1999). Disarmament mainly encompasses the development of responsible arms management 
programs (Coulter, 2004). Demobilization is the formal and controlled process through which 
ex-combatants are taken away from their arm groups to a temporary cantonment centers (UN, 
2006). This transitional, or short-term, period covers the support packages provided to the 
disarmed and demobilized people, a process known as reinsertion (Nilsson, 2005). 
Reinsertion, as a form of transitional assistance offered to ex-combatants, consists of the 
gathering of ex-combatants into a cantonment camp and occurs prior to the longer-term 
reintegration (UN, 1999). This process is short-term and involves the provision of material 
and /or financial assistance which serves to meet immediate needs and can last for one year 
(Nilsson, 2005). Reintegration, however, is the process by which ex-combatants acquire 
civilian status and obtain sustainable employment and income (Coulter, 2004).  It is 
essentially a socio-economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in 
communities at the local level. Reintegration is seen as a part of the general development of a 
post-conflict country, and a way towards boosting the local economic development, and is a 
national responsibility that often necessitates long-term external assistance (Nilsson, 2005; 
UN, 2006). Researches from either African or Asian post-conflict countries depict that 
reintegration is a path to rebuilding and enhancing a post-conflict economy and its success 
relies on its implementation and monitoring through sustainable public works projects 
(Chigunta, 2006).  
2.2.2. Challenges Faced by Ex-combatants in a Post-war Society 
In studying the processes of different impacts of conflicts and some challenges related to ex-
combatants it is apparent that former soldiers face many challenges such as social exclusion, 
lack of skills, unemployment, diseases, amputation, etc. These challenges may compromise 
social peace if they are not efficiently and effectively addressed. This section will only focus 
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on the lack of skills and unemployment as the main post-conflict challenge that ex-
combatants face. The interest in these two challenges is on account of their direct link with 
economic reintegration which is one of the local economic development components in the 
reconstruction of the economy of a post-war society.  
2.2.3. Lack of Skills 
In post-conflict situations many ex-combatants who joined Guerrilla groups at a young age 
return to society much older than they were when they left with few skills and education. The 
conflict period prevents them from accessing the educational and labour markets. This stops 
ex-combatants getting a hold of socially useful skills (Chigunta, 2006). Quite often, they end 
up being unemployed for long time periods of time. This situation generally culminates in a 
vast majority of ex-fighters being dependant on their families (Mashike, 2000). However, this 
situation differs from one country to another. In South Africa, for example, the end of 
apartheid split the former combatants into winners and losers. South African ex-combatants 
who found jobs tailored to their skills are better-off and are still able to earn a living, whereas 
those who did not find jobs are still worse-off and dependant on their families (Mashike, 
2000). In Sierra Leone, however, the study shows that “…there is recognition among ex-
combatants that skills training [is] important… most ex-combatants needed skills training in 
order to have a good life… with some saying that they would want to complete their 
education” (Mashike, 2000: 12). Lack of skills hinders ex-combatants from being competitive 
and marketable in post-conflict economy recovery. 
2.2.4. Unemployment 
There is a close relationship between lack of skills and the unemployment of ex-combatants 
in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Congo and the DRC (Mashike, 2000: 12).  
Unemployment in a post-war situation exposes everyone to social insecurity. Former soldiers 
might jeopardize social peace because of idleness. Employment in a post-conflict society 
must not only be seen as an economic concern for ex-fighters, but also as a great opportunity 
for social reconciliation. A post-conflict society has to find means and ways to create jobs 
that will occupy the unemployed people (Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005). The concept of 
‘unemployed people’ underpins not only ex-combatants but also jobless civilians living in the 
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same location. Addressing the ex-combatants challenges in post-war society is not an easy 
task to undertake since it involves complex issues ranging from lack of skills to 
unemployment. The successful handling of the unemployment of ex-combatants requires a 
good understanding of the various issues surrounding the life of ex-combatants in a post-
conflict community.  
Job creation in a post conflict society constitutes a boost to local economic development as it 
gives the opportunity to train unskilled employees according to the concept of ‘learning by 
doing’. This will enhance the post-war economy (Mashike, 2000). Moreover, the post-
conflict employment must be tailored gradually according to the skills currently in demand 
on the market. This means that jobs must take into account different social skills, including 
those of the returnees without any discrimination (Bennett, 2002). Skills are key to 
productivity, employment and, increasingly, to local economic development. Business 
competitiveness in a post-war context depends on the skilled labour force. Investment in local 
skills and education is one of the key factors to attract and retain businesses. And lack of 
skills can be a key barrier to employment of disadvantaged groups. For this reason, the 
reintegration program is to draw away from disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion to 
focusing on long-term economic development in a post-conflict society. This point leads the 
debate to the next section concerning understanding reintegration.  
2.2.5. The Reintegration of Ex-combatants 
Generally, the reintegration of ex-combatants is a technical process which mainly refers to 
the economic assimilation of demilitarized combatants, particularly, through training and job 
creation schemes. The process aims at curbing the disgruntlement of ex-combatants which 
could undermine the consolidation of the peace (Lundin, 1998; Nilsson, 2005). The socio-
economic aspects with regards to the reintegration of ex-combatants occupy the main focus. 
This is the heart of the program since it makes ex-combatants part of their local civilian 
society. The socio-economic reintegration facilitates community reconciliation. It is a way by 
which ex-combatants and other community’s members should be used as workforce of their 
own society (Nilsson, 2005). Hence, the program requires particular attention to avoid 
tension between ex-combatants and other unemployed groups in society. Nilsson (2005) 
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moreover, implies that the success of reintegration processes lie on theoretical and practical 
levels. By practical definition the author understands reintegration as used by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), national and international organizations. This being 
skills development and job creation which deter ex-combatants from reutilizing their military 
skills. Theoretical definitions consist of different meanings of reintegration which lead to the 
lack of international standardized theory for the reintegration of ex-combatants (Nilsson, 
2005). Nilsson further suggests that when dealing with reintegration of ex-combatants the 
following questions have to be kept in mind so as to distinguish between the two categories 
of definitions. These questions are: who is included in the target group; what is the aim of the 
reintegration; and what methods are prescribed? 
Table 1: Differences between Practical and More Theoretical Definition of Reintegration 
   Practical definition               Theoretical definition 
Target group Ex-combatants, their 
families and other war-
affected groups 
Ex-combatants and their 
families 
Aim Economic and social 
assimilation 
Economic and social 
assimilation 
Method Programs and projects  
 
Source: Nilsson 2005. Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Post-conflict Societies, SIDA. 
Two main observations are being considered from the above chart. Firstly, practical 
definitions quite often include all war-affected groups and their dependents. Secondly, 
practical definitions strive to specifically mention programs and projects whereas theoretical 
definitions leave the question of method open. Both categories of definitions are parallel in 
their goal of the reintegration process as the economic and social incorporation of 
marginalized groups into the civilian community (Nilsson, 2005). Each   different group of 
war-affected individuals has its own needs and the problems linked to these needs are varied. 
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This confirms numerous target groups in the same definition of reintegration, which may 
confuse the most vital element that should be used when working with each category 
(Coulter, 2004). This might cause the ineffectiveness of the reintegration, as was the case in 
Sierra Leone (Nilsson, 2005). The definition of the reintegration of ex-combatants neglects 
the political aspect of the conflict and its importance in the ex-combatants assimilation. Thus, 
it diminishes the role of reintegration. The theoretical and practical definitions of 
reintegration are more technical while the political aspect seems to be more traditional. 
Reintegration processes are, by definition, technical matters for they are most often equated 
with reintegration programs (Stedman, 2002).  
In light of these debates and for the purpose of this research an alternative reintegration 
definition encompassing all ex-combatants aspects is necessary. This definition is tailored to 
the total ex-combatant and comprises of the following aspects: target groups of ex-
combatants and their families, the ex-combatants’ economic assimilation through public 
works projects with reintegration as a major aim; and the method to be used, being much 
broader in order to incorporate all the efforts and projects related to the reintegration 
(Nilsson, 2005). Above all and on the grounds of the aforementioned background the 
reintegration is a societal process aimed at the economic, political, and social assimilation of 
ex-combatants and their families into civilian society. Reintegration being an economic long-
term recovery of ex-combatants takes place in an existing human community whose members 
have been affected by the war. Therefore, the success of reintegration program has to go 
along with reconciliation and cohabitation between the members of the community and the 
returnees. Thus the reintegration program, further, requires a social aspect to be looked at. 
2.2.6. Different Types of Reintegration 
Being the economic assimilation of an ex-combatant the effectiveness of reintegration 
depends upon the economic elements led in a social environment wherein a community’s 
members and ex-combatants accept to cohabit (Brown, 2005). After the short-term 
assimilation (reinsertion) reintegration becomes a much longer process. The aim of 
reintegration at this stage shifts to the socio-economic incorporation of ex-combatants 
through productive activities (Brown, 2005). 
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Table 2: Different Types of Reintegration 
Types Performance indicators 
Social Reintegration Ex-combatants and their dependents are 
accepted into welcoming communities; 
Ex-combatants cohabit and interact with 
other community members within their 
new community 
Economic reintegration Assessment of the basic needs of the ex-
combatants; 
Appraisal of ex-combatants households 
against that of the community average. 
 
Source: Brown, 2005. Reintegration of Ex-combatants through Micro-enterprise 
In most cases of post-conflict societies in developing countries there is a severe shortage of 
skills as alluded to earlier. The question then arises of how employers can demand skills and 
maintain the delicate balance of wanted skills with the reintegration imperative of 
employment? The next section attempts to approach the main justification of skills 
development as the best means of maintaining the balance between reintegration imperatives 
and market demand.  
2.3. Skills Development in a Post-conflict Society 
The disruption of skills acquisition and basic education is a severe cost of armed conflicts and 
require an essential post-conflict commitment to rebuilding schools and training facilities. 
These two requisites will ensure that the balance spoken of earlier is maintained. In addition 
to these, a post-conflict society needs quality assurances involving labour market 
opportunities and the establishment of quality assurances and credentialed trainers. Training 
on technical level as well as the development of core skills should be basic requirements to be 
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established and should focus on non-vocational skills such as social and communication 
skills (Chigunta, 2006). Moreover, ex-combatants also need to be taught life skills, self-
confidence, practical skills, civic and moral learning, group formation, crisis prevention, 
reconciliation and alternative dispute resolution to violence that are very important for their 
social reintegration (Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005). The efficiency and strength of training 
resides in a systematic assessment and a post-training support intervention at a local level.    
During the period of post-conflict reconstruction, employment opportunities and local 
economic development are expected to be boosted. Lessons from post-conflict rebuilding 
reveal that local and international non-governmental organizations provide the most jobs for 
post-conflict societies (Curtain, 2000). This is a real opportunity for ex-combatants who have 
limited skills to become a central workforce. The presence of different NGO’s and 
government sponsored programs in a war-torn community allows ex-combatants to learn 
some other professional, practical and technical skills (Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005). 
Broadening the training of ex-combatants allows for the national economic operators to 
utilize the new skills of the returnees according to their abilities. This contributes to the 
generation of employment opportunities to enhance the broader post-conflict local economic 
development (Curtain, 2000; Chigunta, et al., 2005).  
Most of the post-conflict societies such as Angola, DRC, Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
provide the opportunity to develop skills in mining. However, lessons from conflict analysts 
depict that countries rich in minerals such as diamond, cobalt, coltan, cassiterite, copper, and 
gold are often marred by corruption, authoritarian repression, militarization, and civil war. 
Rebel groups, governments and mining companies exploit mineral resources, fueling civil 
and interstate conflict as players vie for control over riches (Global Witness, 2009:1). Angola, 
DRC, Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Sudan are prominent examples to name a few.  The period of 
war in Angola, Liberia and Sierra-Leone shows that these countries have fallen victim to 
rebels who use revenue from minerals such as diamond and gold to purchase arms and fuel 
for the conflict (Global Witness, 2009:1). Researches from the UN Group of Experts (2008) 
describe close links between individual traders and specific armed groups. It may thus be 
assumed that armed groups derive their strength from these links and that ending the trade or 
bringing it under government control will deprive armed groups of their livelihoods and thus 
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contribute to ending conflict (UN, 2008). Therefore, providing ex-combatants with practical 
skills in mining seems very risky for post-conflict societies and can constitute another root of 
future conflict. 
2.4. Reintegration through Employment Generation  
The lack of availability of jobs renders ex-combatants dependent on their families (Curtain 
2000). Economic reintegration ties much closer to local economic development not only for 
the returnees but also for the whole community. Economic reintegration tackles 
unemployment and skills shortages, which are major obstacles to the successful reintegration 
of ex-combatants into society. Castelo-Branco (1999) links the veterans’ lack of economic 
reintegration and marketable skills to social stigmatization, exclusion and marginalization. 
Although some progress has been made to re-skill veterans, these initiatives have been scarce 
(Chigunta, et al., 2005). One of the main constraints for re-integration programs is the 
economic context into which ex-combatants are incorporated. Employment and livelihood 
opportunities for ex-combatants are crucial to sustainable integration in post-conflict states, 
often characterized by shattered economies and inaccessible tight labour markets (Chigunta, 
et al., 2005). However, the United Nations (2008) suggests a path of solution to the post-
conflict job creation. For the UN, ex-combatants employment programs in post-conflict 
situations should be based on stabilization, reintegration and long -term employment creation. 
The stabilization of employment deals with sustainable income generation and emergency 
employment (UN, 2008). According to this theory, the economic reintegration is carried 
through Public Works Projects and has to start with a social and economic recovery. This 
helps to restore the livelihoods of ex-combatants that experience a great danger to their lives. 
Berg (2006) draws on this stance and suggests that the stabilization of employment is about 
emergency temporary jobs as well as basic livelihood and start-up grants for ex-combatants. 
The reintegration deals with local economic improvement of employment. This program 
suggests that the promoting employment opportunities takes place at a local level, wherein 
the reintegration ultimately takes place. Therefore, attention has to be given to rebuilding 
communities in order to address the root causes of unrest and ease longer term reconciliation 
(UN, 2008). The reintegration program emphasizes the capacity of local government to invest 
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in local socio-economic infrastructure, the reinstatement of a natural resource base and local 
government capacity building (UNCDF and UNDESA, 2006). At this stage, the focus has 
switched from employment creation and income generation to incorporate participation of 
economic actors and include capacity and institution building. This shift in focus leads to a 
peace consolidation process and strong economic reintegration (CGAP, 2004). The long-term 
employment creation probes conditions in which sustainable employment and decent work 
might be created. This program proposes a strong support to policies, institutional capacity 
building at a national level and the creation of a framework related to the community 
participation to define, by consensus building, the rule of the game (UN, 2008).  
The rationale behind this process aims at promoting sustainable long-term development that 
maintains productive and decent employment.  Moreover, this program advises that 
employment found must balance the need for quick action with the importance of a 
sustainable impact (UN/World Bank PCNA, 2007). The link between employment creation, 
income generation and reintegration in a post-conflict setting is shown in fig. 4. 
Figure 2: Curves Measure the Intensity of the Programme (The three tracks of post-conflict 
employment programming) 
 
Source: UN, 2008. Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration in Post-
conflict Settings. 
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Skills development and employment generation programs in a post-conflict society are aimed 
at setting up short-term economic relief. As a post-conflict society starts recovering its 
stability, it has to consider its sustainable development. This highlights a clear link between 
Public Works Projects, local economic development, skills development and job creation 
plans for post-conflict reconstruction.   
2.5. Public Works and Local Economic Development Projects 
Public Works Projects have been a popular programme for poverty alleviation in developing 
countries. The net income gains to participating workers will depend in particular on how 
time allocation across countries and persons respond to the new employment opportunities 
(McCord, 2002; 2003). Public Works Projects and economic development investments help 
support the construction or rehabilitation of essential public infrastructure and facilities 
necessary to generate or retain private sector jobs and investments (McCord, 2003). They 
attract private sector capital and promote regional competitiveness, including investments 
that expand and upgrade infrastructure to attract new industry, support technology-led 
development, redevelop Brownfield sites and provide eco-industrial development 
(McCutcheon, 2001; McCord, 2002). 
2.5. 1. Public Works Projects as a Local Economic Development Engine 
Public Works projects assist to sustain the building or refurbishment of indispensable public 
infrastructure and amenities necessary to produce or hold private sector jobs and investments. 
The argument for Public Works Projects, being a local economic development engine is 
centered on a sustainable work. The public works projects play a different role in low-income 
developing countries. This role is that of a safety, conferring transfer and\or stabilization 
benefits to the poor, while at the same time using the poor’s labor to build infrastructure for 
development (McCutcheon, 2001; McCord, 2002). The effectiveness of the program depends 
on the benefits, costs, and the way resources are raised to finance the program (McCutcheon, 
2001). Public Works Projects also attract private sector capital, uphold local competitiveness, 
support technology-led development, redevelop Brownfield sites and provide eco-industrial 
development (McCord, 2003). The development of an expended Public Works Projects is a 
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path of solution to employment generation and skills development opportunities for the 
unemployed and marginalized people (McCutcheon, 2001; McCord, 2002). 
 Public Works Projects, being a local economic development engine come out as a cross-
cutting programme that has to be implemented by all spheres of government in post-conflict 
country “owned enterprises”. The strengths of Public Works Projects in a post-conflict 
society lies on the fact that these projects intend to provide rapid and visible relief for the 
reintegration of ex-combatants and/or other social marginalized people into civilian society. 
Public Works Projects build the capacity of communities for development, keeping them 
productive and self-reliant in the new society in which they are marginalized (McCutcheon, 
2001).  
At this stage, Public Works Projects need to be allocated a budget in order to create job 
opportunities for the ex-combatants allowing them not only to integrate peacefully into 
civilian society, but also to contribute somehow to the individual and collective 
developmental assets. Public Works Projects are a way of a re-orientating of mainstream 
public expenditure on infrastructure towards labour-intensive techniques for ex combatants to 
become civilians and in need of employment to survive (McCord, 2002). Thus, they help 
define a nation-wide program which draws significant numbers of the ex-combatants into 
productive work, so that workers gain skills while they work, and increase their capacity to 
earn an income.  
The objective of the Public Works Projects through the local economic development is, not 
only to utilize public sector budgets to alleviate ex-combatants unemployment (by creating 
temporary productive employment opportunities coupled with training) (McCord, 2003), but 
also to avoid the raising of another spiral of violence in society between ex-combatants and 
civilian citizens who hold them responsible of economic breakdown, crimes and other social 
nightmares. Public Works Projects which are intended to broaden employment creation and 
skills development in this stage may offer insight into an approach to re-integration through 
projects that develop marketable skills in the fields of infrastructure, housing, tourism, 
agriculture and other disciplines (McCord, 2002; 2003). 
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2.6. Conclusion 
In light of the above discussion, a post-conflict society, in most developing countries is 
characterized not only by the ex-combatants phenomenon, but also by a severe shortage of 
skills and economic disruption. The reintegration of ex-combatants seems to be a form of 
post-war relief as it emerges within war-torn societal planning and is much closer to the idea 
of sustainable development through Public Works Projects. Reintegration programmes are 
drawn on social, political and economic assimilations by which ex-combatants recover their 
civilian status. Several jobs being created by the private sector in most post-conflict 
situations, the involvement of Public Works projects in reintegrating ex-combatants in a post-
war society calls for a sustainable LED further culminates in employment generation, 
wherein ex-combatants and community’s members are beneficiary. However, LED’s aspect, 
being at the heart of the post-conflict reconstruction has to draw more attention to the 
reintegration programme. This aspect leads us to the next chapter with respect to LED in a 
post-conflict society.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Government, business and civil society are increasingly in search of the means to raise and 
pursue economic development strategies and sort out socio-economic problems jointly. Each 
with a specific function, these new paradigms complement each other in order to promote 
endogenous development using every opportunity to apply local assets, skills and knowledge 
in order to uphold competitiveness. Local Economic Development (LED), skills development 
and job creation in a post-conflict situation are very important. They work alongside to 
rebuild and enhance the post-conflict local economy by using rationally local, scarce 
resources and making local communities responsible for their own development (World Bank 
Group, 2009). This chapter addresses the concerns with regard to how should LED happen 
and what are the processes related to a post-conflict LED consolidation. It also probes into 
the need of public and private partnership in post-conflict mega-projects, and assesses the 
post-conflict review pertinent to DDR programmes and LED as a means of rebuilding a post-
conflict society. 
3.2. Local Economic Development 
Local economic development is a way by which a local community in collaboration with 
other external stakeholders assesses and manages local scarce resources in order to raise 
external investments for the enhancement of local development. It is a collective effort in 
which local people from all communities work together to boost their local productivity. This 
participatory process results in a planned and sustainable economy. It is a local strategy that 
helps create decent employment and improves the quality of life for community members, 
including those who are underprivileged and marginalized. Local economic development 
comes up with partnerships between public and private sectors and civil society. It is a means 
by which local communities find common solutions to the economic problems affecting their 
society (Rogerson, 2005; World Bank Group, 2009). The United States Agency for 
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International Development (USAID) puts forward that the LED process brings together 
resources from outside and within the society in order to address challenges and promote the 
economic growth (World Bank Group, 2009). For LED to take shape it needs a development 
framework which fits into the local realities. 
3.2.1. Local Economic Development Framework 
The LED process aims at empowering local communities to successfully make use of all 
local economic potential in order to establish priorities (for example: to promote high quality 
jobs, reduce poverty and generate municipal taxes). LED practitioners have many actions 
available to them (World Bank Group, 2009). For LED to be successful, participants and 
practitioners should have knowledge of these actions and be committed to a process that 
enables them to achieve sustainable results. An LED framework requires strategic planning in 
order to realize a successful and predetermined outcome (Nel, 2005; Rogerson, 2005).  
The useful LED framework as utilized in most developing countries is that from USAID 
(World Bank Group, 2009). This paradigm shift points to the LED framework as a set of 
oriented policies and non-prescriptive endeavors which incorporate (Nel and Rogerson, 
2005):  
 LOCAL values: a mechanism to assess the local potential that makes rational use of 
the already existing local capacities. 
 ECONOMIC drivers: the capacity of identifying asset opportunities, sustaining 
commercial activities and facilitating the access to (new) markets. 
 DEVELOPMENT: the promoting of social wellbeing by creating decent jobs and 
regenerating income for the community.  
Although the USAID’s LED design is a unique and useful framework pertaining to an LED, 
its approaches, however, are variable and depend on different actors involved in the LED 
process. This leads the debate to the next section with regard to various LED approaches. 
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3.2.2. Various LED Approaches 
The current and useful LED approaches are from USAID. Nel and Rogerson (2005) draw on 
USAID’s approaches and propose the essentials of an LED. These include: 
 Public and private partnership approach: to assess or seize the comparative economic 
advantage. 
 Small business approach: for innovation, private investment and job creation. 
 Regional approach: leveraging the resources of surrounding areas. 
 Sector-cluster approach: supporting the most promising sectors by bringing together 
business, educational institutions, NGOs and government. 
These LED approaches form the core of the principles associated with LED. 
3.2.3. Principles Associated with Local Economic Development 
  When leading an LED certain requirements are to be taken into account (World Bank 
Group, 2009). These are: 
 Private/public partnership: LED is a local way of maximizing local potential in 
attracting external investments. It requires an efficient partnership between private, 
public and non-profit actors allowing the junction in the program of investment 
between the different stakeholders. All principles associated to the LED set up a 
partnership between the private and public sectors. This bilateral cooperation requires 
a clear coordination from different developmental activities.  
 Making people participate in local decisions: a current dialogue promotes and 
encourages the creation of social networking which leads to social development. 
Local stakeholders play an important role in the development of their community. 
Local communities and their leaders should continuously engage in dialogue.   
Dialogue between different stakeholders in local economic development is a way forward to 
the success of the LED. As it allows all actors to collectively discuss development issues.   
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3.2.4. Successful Local Economic Development Strategies 
A local economy has to respond to the aspirations of local inhabitants. Community 
participation at a local level is the backbone in planning a local development strategy. 
However, a successful LED in a post-conflict area, based on a trustful partnership between all 
local stakeholders, has to be at the center of addressing national economic growth. LED 
strategy in a post-conflict area should reflect a broader planning process for a rural area. This 
entails that issues related to poverty are addressed and scarce resources are well targeted and 
managed. The LED strategic planning should fit into other local planning processes (Nel and 
Rogerson, 2005; World Bank Group, 2009). Lessons from LED project management tell that 
an LED has to be a guided strategy. The World Bank Group (2009) implies four stages for an 
LED strategic planning process: effort organization, the assessments of local economic 
potentialities, the establishment of an approach to be adopted (vision, goals, objectives, and 
programs, projects and action plans), implementation and evaluation.  
The mechanism to reach this strategy goes through the creation of a local development 
council taking the lead of the local development projects and a community organization 
represented by the local civil society. The development council should encompass donors, 
national government members and local community represented by civil society (Kenneth, 
2006). LED increasingly appears as a strong tool in supporting greater democracy and 
transparency at the local level (World Bank Group, 2009). The success of LED lies upon the 
understanding of different local resource opportunities. Local Communities are strongly 
advised to draft the program model that is going to be a part of their strategy (World Bank 
Group, 2009). Below are different components of local economic strategy (Fig. 5). 
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Figure 2: Illustrative components of Local Economic strategy 
 
Source: World Bank Group, 2009 www.makingcitiesworks.org 
3.2.5. Planning of Local Economic Development in Post-conflict Society and the Need for a 
Decentralisation System 
Countries emerging from a severe socio-economic disruption are expected to develop micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises to revive their post-conflict economy (Brown, 2005). 
Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises offer new opportunities to local employment, 
wealth and tax generation in a post-war torn society. Visible results can help maintain 
momentum in the short term, and simply initiating a single project focusing on one critical 
issue might pave the way for long-term success (World Bank Group, 2009). Ultimately, LED 
is about sustainable long term development, for it takes time to change local conditions and 
mind sets (Brown, 2005). Moreover, LED is about building capacity, it also organizes 
participatory processes and empowers stakeholders, especially the poor (Nel and Rogerson, 
2005). Overall, a post-war LED needs strategic-planning to meet the long term social 
expectations (World Bank Group, 2009). 
Planning for LED in a post-conflict society also calls upon the principle of decentralisation 
(Blackely and Bradshaw, 2002). According to this principle, decentralisation, in a post-
conflict situation, increases economic efficiency because local governments are better 
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positioned than the national government to deliver public services as a result of information 
advantage. Population mobility and competition among local governments for delivery of 
public services will ensure the matching of performances of local communities and local 
governments (Romeo, 2002). Decentralisation considerations in this case suggest that policies 
aimed at the provision of public services such as infrastructure and education (that are 
sensitive to regional and local conditions) is likely to be more effective in encouraging 
growth than centrally-determined policies that ignore these geographical differences (Ibid). 
The rationale behind decentralisation of systems in local economic development is about 
creating an enabling economic environment, balancing social and economic policy, and 
creating an environment for trade, investment and hiring (Kotzé and Hussein, 2008).  
Consequently, with other things being equal, a decentralised local economic development 
system where local governments play a more important role than the central government in 
public service prevision leads to more rapid economic growth (Kenneth, 2006). 
Decentralisation will increase public sector efficiency therefore improving service delivery 
and regulation. This will create a more conducive business environment and greater 
incentives for investors. Local officials will have better local knowledge and business 
contacts making them more able to make locally relevant, appropriate decisions. 
Decentralisation is a good way towards LED in a post-conflict society for it reduces the 
opportunities for corruption, particularly large scale corruption. This has a beneficial effect 
on national economic growth. However, decentralisation without competent state 
administration is likely to aggravate social fracturing and to foster inequalities while, at the 
same time, failing to assist in public service delivery and local economic development.  
To remedy this situation, Blackely and Bradshaw (2002) suggest a particular attention being 
paid on both strengths and weaknesses of public officers, particularly their ability to manage 
and account. Such assessments being very important, give donors the opportunity of 
appraising the level of oversight and technical assistance that public officers (local actors) 
need. Hence, it will assist in planning for pre-project and in-service capacity building as 
required (Bambang Bintoro Soedjito, 2004).  
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A successful post-conflict LED model of decentralisation based on different partnership 
capacities is presented in fig. 6.  
Figure 3: Model of decentralisation for a successful LED 
 
 
Source: UN Capital Development Fund and the UNDP, 2002 
Economic development outside of agriculture and indigenous small and micro enterprise 
sectors are largely a matter of central government, parastatal enterprises and mostly foreign 
investors or transnational corporations. These enterprises were generally large and vertically 
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integrated (UNDP, 2002). That is to say that they internalize the production of inputs and of 
allied services and thereby minimized their demand for inputs and services from other local 
producers. However the decentralization model as set above (Fig. 10) shows that localities 
are increasingly thrown onto themselves to create ‘place prosperity’, to establish the right 
conditions for the economic advancement of its population (Ibid).  
3.2.6. Towards Local Economic Development in a Post-conflict Society 
Local economic development (LED) is an approach towards economic development which 
allows and encourages local people to work together to achieve sustainable economic growth 
and development. LED brings economic benefits and improves the quality of life for all 
residents in a local municipal area by developing business opportunities. This spells that the 
LED appraisal has to shape a contextual framework which provides preliminary details of the 
probable activities, intended specific end results, likely project duration and needed input of 
human and financial resources to attain the expected end results. However, the critical 
elements of start/know the start decision in a post-war situation should include the following 
considerations (World Bank Group, 2009):  
 The feasibility of the local economic development and the possibility that it will lead 
to a carefully planned private-public growth strategy in one or more local 
communities; 
 An appraisal of the importance that local and national government and business 
leaders attach to a LED initiative; 
 LED capacity to produce tangible results connected to private investment, jobs 
created, jobs retained and increased incomes; 
 LED likelihood to bring strengthened  institutions within different communities; 
 The ability and assurance of LED community leaders; 
 The capability of LED team (technical staff or board); 
 The trust between different stakeholders’ offices involved in a LED initiative.   
Local economic development in a post-war situation is critical to the economic reintegration 
of ex-combatants. Reintegration programs provide for employment and skills useful for the 
building of a post-conflict LED. For this to happen, cooperation between different 
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stakeholders is required. The following section tries to unpack different partnerships and 
stakeholders that make LED happen within the context of a post-conflict situation. 
3.3. Public and Private Partnership in Mega-projects 
A public sector is a part of the economy concerned with providing basic government services. 
The composition of the public sector varies by country, but in most countries the public 
sector includes such services as the police, military, Public Works and healthcare for the poor 
(World Bank Group, 2009). The public sector might provide services that a non-payer cannot 
be excluded from (such as street lighting), services which benefit all of society rather than 
just the individual who uses the service (such as public education) and services that 
encourage equal opportunity. The private sector, however, is a part of the economy that is 
owned and controlled by private individuals and business organizations such as private and 
public limited companies (Ibid). In a free enterprise economy, the private sector is 
responsible for allocating most of the resources within the economy. This contrasts with the 
public sector, where economic resources are owned and controlled by the state (World Bank 
Group, 2009).  
Public and private partnership in mega-projects means that the private sector comes to work 
alongside public sector in bringing its management expertise and/or monetary contributions 
to the government projects with the aim of achieving public benefit. In this case, a public and 
private partnership (PPP) becomes a contract between a public sector institution/municipality 
and a private party, in which the private party assumes substantial financial, technical and 
operational risk in the design, financing, building and operation of a project. And the public 
sector provides them with the developmental framework and necessary infrastructures (World 
Bank Group, 2009). 
Private enterprises have played, in most post-conflict societies, a central role in rebuilding the 
economic infrastructure. Nowadays the private enterprises are generators of future economic 
growth and permanent job creation. By private sector, one can understand international 
enterprises that can invest on their own account or partner with local firms. The latter is 
generally unmatched in its ability to assemble people, capital and innovation to create 
meaningful jobs and to profitably produce goods and services that meet the needs and 
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requirements of people (World Bank Group, 2009). Projects from private sectors generally 
target a given local community in need of assistance. Every opportunity to jumpstart the local 
private sector must be exploited, beginning with establishing of local priorities for 
community-level projects that can use local private initiative and talent (ibid). This complex 
task requires the participation of the local community.  
Post-conflict reintegration and reconstruction should be combined whenever possible, even if 
longer time frames are necessary. When serious reconstruction projects are underway, 
incentives should be provided to international contractors to subcontract with domestic and 
local companies that employ local labour (World Bank Group, 2009). Local government as 
one of the stakeholders in the local development has to create public development projects 
that enable the local economic development environment in a post-conflict area to develop. 
These governments may find it efficient to contract with small local entrepreneurs to provide 
many of the services that are often provided by local or regional governments. The projects 
might be Mega or Micro-Public Works Projects that engineer LED. The funding thereof, 
should also be provided for the recovery of local small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
which will probably be the principal local sources of long-term employment in most post-
conflict communities (World Bank Group, 2009).  
Viable state structure is the vehicle of post-conflict reconstruction and local economy 
development, for it provides a post-conflict development framework that includes security 
issues, rule of law, economic development, and political stability. State-building in countries 
emerging from conflicts is a daunting task (World Bank Group, 2009). A recent experience, 
particularly in Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and other Sub-Saharan 
Africa post-conflict countries suggests that although private sector participation is required, 
outsiders cannot simply impose governance or public sector structures (Chigunta, et al., 
2005). Local groups must be involved in the process to ensure legitimacy and sustainability. 
This is the reason why public and private sectors are bound to work together to promote the 
reconstruction of post-conflict society. The public sector provides for the fundamental state 
infrastructure and developmental framework, while the private sector comes up with its 
management expertise and monetary contribution to cement the post-conflict reconstruction 
(Muggah, 2008). 
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Armed conflicts disrupt not only a country’s socio-political fabric, but also the basic ability 
of an economy to function. Conflicts create incalculable losses, not only in a real physical 
sense but also in terms of lost economic growth and development. The key objective of post-
conflict reconstruction efforts should be restoration of the domestic capacity for a productive 
and dynamic market economy, thereby establishing the basis for a prosperous society 
(Colletta, et al., 1996; Anderlin and Pampell Conaway, 2004). Thus, the private sector plays a 
crucial role in the restoration of a post-conflict domestic capacity for a reproductive and 
dynamic market economy. The private sector’s business agendas can offer reformers a list of 
what needs to be addressed on the day-to-day policymaking level to spur economic growth 
and, therefore, provide economic and job opportunities for ex-combatants and regular 
citizens.  
Experiences from Angola and Ethiopia show how the business community can co-operate 
and speak with a unified voice on the crucial issues pertaining to post-conflict rebuilding and 
development. Angolan and Ethiopian private entrepreneurs spent a whole year working 
together with national authorities and local communities to create an economic plan for the 
country. The aims and objectives of these stakeholders were: identification of constraints to 
doing business, prioritization of problems, and determination of opportunities for reform, 
recommendation of specific solutions, and building trust (Chigunta, et al., 2005). This 
bottom-up effort clearly demonstrates that the private sector is more likely to commit to 
reforms if local entrepreneurs themselves are the ones participating in drafting their own 
development framework than if they are just handed a list written up by someone else. 
Likewise, governments (public sector) are more likely to listen to the voices of their own 
constituents rather than those of outsiders (Colletta, et al., 1996; Anderlini and Pampell 
Conaway, 2004).  
The importance of the local buy-in achieved in this manner cannot be overestimated. 
Significantly, a business agenda is not only a litany of problems but is also a compilation of 
actionable solutions that can be actively promoted and presented before the local government. 
By virtue of generating this public-private dialogue on key reconstruction and development 
issues, the business agenda committed by all stakeholders enhances democratic process, 
giving the business community a platform for providing input into policymaking in an open, 
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transparent and  accountable manner. The point to be made here is that, public and private 
sectors in Mega Projects are a sine qua non of post-conflict reconstruction with the 
government taking the lead. This partnership must be predicated to identifying and 
recognizing the developmental challenges of the post-conflict situation, sorting out 
comparative advantages and synergizing, staking out mutual responsibilities and 
accountabilities, and geared exclusively to complementing government effort (Castelo-
Branco, 1999). Greater attention needs to be given, especially, to the complementary role of 
civil society, whose grassroots processes can be harnessed for effective reconstruction efforts. 
For example, in Somalia, administration by elders' councils had transformed the city of 
Baidoa (Curtain, 2000). This means that success in reconstruction is aided by the direct 
participation in, and ownership of, the reconstruction effort by the country's communities at 
all levels and also by the broad and coordinated participation of key NGOs (Castelo-Branco, 
1999).  
Community participation brings to local citizens the experience in running their own 
organizations and practicing democracy at a local level. Democratic experience helps create 
confidence and belief in self rule. Community participation, therefore, leads people towards a 
long-term local project ownership. Thus, national, provincial and local governments, through 
their Public Works Department, should initiate developmental projects compelling 
community participation. This implies the need for a broad partnership between all 
stakeholders in the post-conflict reconstruction process. In sight of what has been said above 
the general argument of this research will look at the usefulness of Public Works Projects for 
local economic development to see whether Kivu has what it takes and actually benefits from 
the Public Works Projects. 
3.4. Assessment of Post-conflict Review   
By contextualizing a review of the literature on DDR programmes, most scholars dealing 
with this matter seem to agree that the demilitarization of combatants (known as 
demobilization and reintegration) is a volatile issue (Lamb, 1997). This is due to the fact that 
the mismanagement of this process might create a new opportunity for ex-combatants to 
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disrupt the entire peace process. However, if the DDR process is well handled, it can create 
opportunities for sustainable peace and human development (Chigunta, 2006).  
Many reintegration exercises have taken place since the late 1980s in several Sub-Saharan 
African countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Rwanda. Similarly, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Liberia and Sierra Leone have had to deal with the enormous problems of 
reintegrating large numbers of children and young people who were either abducted by rebel 
or government forces or who joined the local militias (Mkandawire, 1996). The aim of 
reintegration, which is the stabilization and establishment of the long-term economic 
development of ex-combatants (Sesay, 2002; Specker, 2006), starts with the allocating of 
reinsertion benefits to ex-combatants (Speacker, 2006). These reintegration benefits are based 
on an approach that draws a line between an individual’s status as an ex-combatant and as a 
civilian (Zerdem and Alpaslan, 2002). 
The UN definition of reintegration (that is based on assistance to be provided to all war 
affected people) implies that when dealing with the reintegration process, the support given to 
former combatants and their dependants to enable them to reintegrate into civilian life should 
also be extended to other war affected populations who did not take up arms during the 
period of strife (Geneva Convention of 1949; Optional Protocol 2001). The servicing of all 
post-conflict groups without privileging anyone allows for the implementation of 
reconstruction programmes that will lead to recovery and economic development 
programmes (National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 
2001; Doyle, 2002; Green, 2002; Collier and Sabanis, 2005).   
Zerdem and Alpaslan (2002) probe into the reintegration issue in the context of security. For 
them, once ex-combatants are released or set free from armies much should be done to ensure 
that their civilian life should not become a threat to social peace. Doyle (2002) supports this 
stance in saying that ex-combatants should be retrained in civilian education (informing them 
about rights and duties, opportunities and constraints) before being released into society. 
When looking at these different views relating to the reintegration of ex-combatants all 
authors propose a new orientation of ex-combatants into society. Innes and Booher (2003) 
concur with Doyle’s stance. For them, this re-orientation includes not only social support and 
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economic opportunities, but also needs to be given to the communities where ex-combatants 
are due to settle. Castells (1996) and Colletta (1996) link reintegration programmes to the 
economy aspect. They understand reintegration as the return of ex-combatants to their former 
home or to a new location. For them, ex-combatants have to be economically supported by 
being provided with reinsertion benefits at this stage. Following from the literature above, it 
can be argued that the objective of reintegration is the economic incorporation of ex-
combatants and their dependants into civilian society, with the direct result being economic 
self-reliance and productivity (Mausse, 1999).  
Writing on different inter-related aspects of reintegration, namely, political, social and 
economic, Colletta (1997) and Doyle (2002) suggest that the social and economic aspects of 
reintegration should proceed in parallel in order for reintegration to be effective. Broadly, 
Colletta and Doyle try to depict the political, social and economic context in which 
demobilization and reintegration should occur. For these scholars, this context invariably 
influences the outcomes of the reintegration programme (Colletta, 1997; Doyle, 2002). The 
success of the economic reintegration of ex-combatants should be a post-conflict-society 
milestone since it allows for social stability. Mashike (2000) while studying reintegration 
processes, such as the one led in Ethiopia brings up the programme characteristics that 
support Colletta’s argument. The success of the reintegration of ex-combatants in Ethiopia is 
attributed to the economic aspect of the reintegration programme and the following-up of ex-
combatants development projects through the use of Public Works Projects across the country 
(Mashike, 2000). The Ethiopian reintegration process epitomizes successful reintegration in 
Africa. Quoting Muggah in his research in respect of Ethiopian reintegration, the author says: 
  
“The scale and scope of the Ethiopian demobilization and reintegration programme 
was breathtaking. Between 2000 and 2003, more than 148 000 veterans (including 
more than 17 000 disabled soldiers) were disarmed and demobilized by the Ministry 
of Defense and provided with cash and non-monetary reinsertion and reintegration 
assistance via the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. The Ethiopian process was 
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carried out efficiently and according to declared principles of transparency and equity, 
making successful the reintegration programme” (Muggah, 2008: 1). 
The Ethiopian reintegration has been one of the most successful reintegration programmes 
across the continent that has used Public Works as a locomotive to empower and market ex-
combatants. The reintegration of ex-combatants in Ethiopia was based on re-skilling and 
retraining returnees through different Public Works Projects. The training and skill 
development issues were addressed by offering ex-combatants appropriate skills, correctly 
tailored to the socio-economic environment realities, allowing them to be competitive on the 
job market (Muggah, 2008).  
Some other examples of successful reintegration in Africa occurred over the past few years. 
Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001) depict the Rwandese reintegration as a successful process 
amongst others. Between 1997 and 2001 the Rwandese government with the support of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had reintegrated more than 18 000 ex-
combatants. The World Bank revamped and expanded the reintegration programme in June 
2001 with the result being an additional reintegration of 36 000 ex-combatants from the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and armed groups. The World Bank supported the Rwandese 
reintegration programme which was aimed at providing assistance to veterans of war to 
reinstate them into civilian life and to re-orientate the government expenditure from military 
activities to social and economic sectors (International Development Association, 2007).  
The 1990s Namibian reintegration occurred in a fragile situation wherein the transition from 
war to peace was wielded by two opposing forces under the United Nations supervision 
(Anderlini and Pampell Conaway, 2004). There was no reintegration plan for Namibian ex-
combatants. Neither the United Nations nor the new government conceived a reintegration 
programme for ex-combatants. The assistance brought to ex-combatants was simply ad hoc 
activities hastily made by the government to keep veterans from any protestation (Colletta, et 
al., 1996; Anderlini and Pampell Conaway, 2004). Having been a patchwork of well-intended 
responses, Namibian reintegration programme lacked strategic government policy and a 
planned programme (Anderlini and Pampell Conaway, 2004), which resulted in the 
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dissatisfaction of ex-combatants due to the government’s discrepancies in its promises and 
the reality of an opportunity-constrained environment (Colletta, et al., 1996).  
In approaching the post-apartheid society in South Africa, Harrison (2006) argues that the 
integrated development planning process produces more integrated participatory ways of 
working and a more united government. Furthermore that this integration (if it has occurred) 
has led to more effective service delivery and to more effective responses to problems such as 
poverty, HIV/AIDS, crime and spatial fragmentation.  
In Liberia, however, 1500 ex-combatants have been trained in agriculture and are still 
involved in illegal sectors. Writing on Liberian ex-combatants reintegration, Harsch (2005) 
reveals that those who were keen on completing their study were sent to schools and have 
currently graduated and resettled in their home communities, where they are being allocated 
land to raise crops and animals for cash. Pre-vocational numeracy and literacy is given to 
those who do not know how to read and write, and counsellors are on hand to help with 
problems related to war trauma (Harsch, 2005). Liberian economic reintegration is one of the 
more successful African ex-combatants’ reintegration models. Due to its particularity drawn 
from an innovative reintegration programme, it manages to bring together intensive 
agricultural skills training, conflict resolution skills and experience, literacy and numeracy 
training, assistance returning to home communities, and help starting a small agricultural 
enterprise.  
However, analyzing what has been called reintegration programme in Sierra Leone, findings 
of some authors portray that ex-combatants have been reinserted instead of being 
reintegrated. Harsch (2005: 1) gives one way forward when he says:  
“The National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(NCDDR) was faced with the problems of limited funds and facilities available for 
the reintegration of the large number of ex-combatants who had completed the 
disarmament and demobilization phase, due to the lack of consistent funding through 
the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and the capacity of implementing partners. This 
resulted in the delivery of only short-term training opportunities, without many 
apprenticeships or on-the-job training in existing workshops or businesses”.  
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The NCDDR’s vocational training in Sierra Leone offered to ex-combatants focused on - 
among other things - carpentry, masonry, hairdressing, tailoring and metal works. However, 
there are limited employment opportunities for such trades (Harsch, 2005). Again in the case 
of Sierra Leone, apprenticeships or in-service training has fit as an excellent model of 
economic reintegration (Chigunta, 2006). This should have resulted in more sustainable 
employment and reintegration, but Harsch (2005: 2) as well as other analysts of Sierra 
Leone’s post-conflict society note that “the lack of education and training coordination 
capacity, official accreditation of the certificates and qualifications attained the shortage of 
well-experienced trainers and trainers who used rigid, instructor-oriented methodologies, 
turned the training into quick-fix endeavours with little impact”.  
Ethiopia and Eritrea have done a reintegration relatively straightforward. The conflict 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia involved only regular armies, which facilitated the reintegration 
programmes of different army fractions. The Eritrea and Ethiopia ex-combatants’ economic 
reintegration went fairly smoothly, for ex-combatants had been welcomed into their society 
as heroes, and the reintegration programme focused on development projects which provided 
ex-combatants with jobs opportunities (Green, 2002; Gera, 2003; Harsch, 2005).   
However, in countries where opposing armed forces are in conflict with each other, the 
dynamics are different. Here, ex-combatants have fought for a power deal and expect to wield 
power after the conflict. This situation occurred in Mozambique wherein government and the 
rebel Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) signed a peace accord in 1992. After 
Renamo ex-combatants’ reintegration, they subsequently took part in national elections 
(Harsch, 2005). Angola, however, experienced a decade and half of civil war during which 
several ex-combatants were released into society (Mungoi, 1999). The Angolan reintegration 
programmes as conceived by the government trained approximately 10 500 ex-combatants, 
resulting in most of them choosing farming and agriculture, micro-enterprises and existing 
businesses. Those returnees who have not been able to undertake their own businesses are 
assisted, working for different development projects contracted by the government.  
From the aforementioned review, it follows that planning for ex-combatants’ reintegration 
consists of building local authorities’ capacity to plan and manage the delivery of immediate 
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assistance and sustainable public services both in the emergency and the longer term recovery 
phases of LED (Romeo, 2002). This approach requires a systemic planning that recognizes 
three critical levels (Ibid): 
 The local authorities themselves, where capacity must be built to plan, programme, 
budget, implement, monitor and evaluate local emergency, recovery and development 
activities. 
 The decentralised State administration, (at provincial/regional level) where capacity 
must be built to provide the financial and technical support that local authorities will 
require and exercise the necessary legality controls and performance monitoring. 
 The communities of both returnees, demobilized and other residents, whose 
settlement-level and special interests organizations must be promoted and 
strengthened to actively participate in local government processes of allocation of 
resources and programmes/projects implementation. 
Hence, planning for ex-combatants’ reintegration is not just synonymous with training of 
individuals, but requires changes in the institutions. Those individuals have to operate in the 
legal framework of those institutions (Romeo, 2002). In addition to being systemic, the 
consequence is that capacity building effort of post-conflict’s LED must be “experimental”. 
Accordingly, it must be carried out through the practical experimentation of decentralization 
policies and improved local institutions (Ibid). This point is critical as it implies both the 
possibility and the necessity of starting the local capacity building process of LED as early as 
possible in the post-conflict period. This might need to happen in seemingly unfavorable 
policy environments. For systemic planning to happen, post-conflict countries have to use 
practical experimentation to build local government capacity (Romeo, 2002). This was based 
on (Ibid): 
 Local Government financing. This means that in the long term, comprehensive fiscal 
decentralization measures, including substantial devolution of fiscal powers, should 
be considered. However in most post-conflict environments the first step is the set up 
of a mechanism for fiscal transfer providing local authorities with a minimum of 
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regular and locally programmable resources for both recovery and development 
spending. 
 Local Government planning and budgeting. As a minimum of programmable 
resources is made available to local authorities, a simple, participatory procedure for 
strategic planning, investment programming and annual budgeting, should also be 
extended. Local level planning would be made meaningful by the existence of the 
above minimum of locally programmable resources and could be institutionalized as a 
truly local government planning process rather than be just a requirement to access 
externally financed programmes, as is currently the case with most programmes 
promoting “participatory planning”. 
 Local Government implementation. In most post-conflict environments and 
particularly in resource-poor countries, much of the resources available for local level 
infrastructure and services delivery will continue to flow through national/sector 
channels or will be managed by central agencies (including specialized ones like the 
World Bank-supported Social Funds). While these resources, which are purpose-
specific and aid-financed, are not an alternative to fiscal transfers, and have not the 
same wide impact on local capacity building, they may offer to local actors an 
opportunity for implementing centrally financed projects and activities. This in turn 
requires that the capacity of both local administrations and community organizations 
for implementation (procurement, contracts administration, etc.) be strengthened. 
In the immediate period after the end of war, the creation of jobs through Public Works 
Projects and the stimulation of micro and small enterprises are crucial. To overcome this 
challenge, new macro-economic policies and institutions, as well as capacity-building for 
people working in governmental institutions, are required to encourage the development of 
market mechanisms that can efficiently and effectively allocate scarce economic resources. In 
post-conflict countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, South Africa and Rwanda, to name 
a few, international actors encouraged post-conflict’s governments to promote private sector 
development, creation of economic opportunities for business operation and development as 
well as entrepreneurship training and policy frameworks for small and medium enterprise 
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development. They have also assisted governments to establish sustainable partnerships with 
the private sector, where the latter exists (public private partnerships), and carefully balance 
its interactions in this area in order to prevent polarization of interests that might undermine 
the benefits of the general population, hence generating renewed or even new conflict. 
In light of what has been analysed above, it follows that economic reintegration includes the 
change of institutions, the policy and framework of these institutions, and provisions for 
absorbing ex-combatants into restructured lucrative conditions. Ex-combatants with limited 
education and few skills other than fighting are the most attractive incentives for taking part 
in the reintegration (Chigunta, 2006), as they have to switch from being combatant to civilian 
life (Harsch, 2005). 
3.4. Conclusion 
Following from the literature above, it can be concluded that early support of local civil 
society groups interested in local economic development and livelihoods may reduce future 
external aid needs as communities’ capacity and initiative grow. Post-conflict’s LED entails 
available technical help and funding for long-term job promotion activities, including 
counseling, training, finding and providing information about jobs, and job placement. 
Systemic planning based on decentralization is essential for long-term LED and permanent 
job creation. This suggests that donors should work with host country stakeholders in 
building local capacity to promote economic growth. Careful assessment and monitoring are 
essential. In this regard, local authorities should be encouraged to organize partnerships 
among local government institutions, private businesses, and community groups to pursue 
LED goals. Responsive government institutions and an honest, transparent regulatory 
framework are vital if the private sector is to rise to the challenges of reconstruction and be 
an engine of LED and new employment. Particularly important are viable legal institutions 
that guarantee property rights and the sanctity of contracts, along with properly functioning 
financial markets and supporting institutions. However, how can Public Works Projects fit in 
LED trough reintegrating ex-combatants? This issue leads the discussion to the next chapter 
pertaining to ex-combatants’ economic reintegration. 
 
PLANNING FOR EX-COMBATANTS’ REINTEGRATION IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: 
LESSONS LEARNT FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES FOR KIVU IN THE DEMOCRATIQUE 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
45 
 
CHAPTER 4:  
EX-COMBATANTS’ ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Many African countries are emerging from large-scale armed conflicts that have left a legacy 
of chaotic economies, depleted productive capacities and sources of revenue. The peace 
dividend needs to be understood in social and economic terms, as well as financial terms. It is 
useful to link a country’s overall macroeconomic reform program to the planned economic 
reintegration program.  Jump-starting the economy by rehabilitating critical infrastructure 
also can be linked to reintegration programs that involve training and employment schemes 
for both reconstructing material assets and building human and social capital. The realization 
of this objective hinges on the reintegration of ex-combatants into productive civilian roles.  
This chapter discusses the economic reintegration of ex-combatants in a post-conflict society 
such as designed by Suzan Brown (2005). The analysis is focused on the economic 
opportunities and the viability options that ex-combatants are given during their transition to 
civilian life. The chapter will also look at some cases of ex-combatants’ economic 
reintegration as they have occurred in certain African post-conflict societies.   
4.2. Analysis of Ex-combatants’ Economic Reintegration 
As soon as a conflict ends, assessing job opportunities and services that might fit to ex-
combatants’ skills profile is vital in the designing and planning of an economic reintegration 
program (UN, 2006). The analysis of labour market should be recurrent and must encompass 
the implementation of the reintegration program. The labour market should not be a foreign 
process to the reintegration; rather, “it has to include analysis of culturally appropriate 
professions for men and women of varying age groups, recognizing how conflict may have 
changed cultural norms about gender-appropriate work” (Chigunta, 2006: 67). Therefore, 
national and local governments through Public Works projects, in a post-conflict situation, 
bear the total responsibility of leading a market analysis (ibid). This task is devoted to the 
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ministry of labour and that of public works. Local experts and national authorities should 
have sufficient resources to conduct ex-combatant training activities and have to be equipped 
enough to do so. Ideally, a partnership between UN agencies, national officials, local and 
international non-governmental organizations should be an option to be prioritized (Chigunta, 
2005; UN, 2006). National and local authorities should promote developmental Public Works 
Projects that are aimed at hiring marginalized people (Bennett, 2002).   
Kapitsa (2002) advises that a post-conflict reconstruction framework should draw its 
foundation from labour-based Public Works Projects and public sector job creation in a 
broader vision of integrated post-conflict development programme based on a temporary 
measure. The understanding of temporary situation of labour-based public programmes and 
public sector job creation should reflect every national expenditure as it is set down through 
the national budget (Okojie, 2003). In this fact, the failure of reintegration programs to 
provide sustainable job opportunities for ex-combatants might be handled by hiring them into 
Public Works. This makes the reintegration programs draw on the overall sustainable 
economic development strategies (UN, 2006).  
The following are different Public Works Projects’ options that a reintegration programme 
might draw on to economically assimilate ex-combatants. 
4.2.1. Training and Skills Development 
The lack of fundamental and advanced education for ex-combatants has prevented ex-
combatants opportunities to be competitive on the job market. Providing ex-combatants with 
a tailored informal education or vocational training according to their different age groups 
increases the ex-combatants’ chances of being marketable (UN, 2006; 
www.unddr.org/iddrs/og).  
Training is not a reintegration process. Rather, a tool that reintegration program should utilize 
to reach its goal of reintegration.  Reintegration managers should conceive a training program 
that tackles the basic problems of ex-combatants. Planning an ex-combatant training model 
means the teaching should address the imperatives of the informal sector in which ex-
combatants are expected to start up the livelihoods. This means during the training period, ex-
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combatants should have a mental map of their near future in terms of their socio-economic 
profile (UN, 2006; www.unddr.org/iddrs/og). Well trained ex-combatants are marketable, 
particularly in the private sectors and business development. 
4.2.2. Private Sector and Business Development Services 
A post-conflict society should have a post-conflict development framework in which policies 
and programs with regard to business creation and support for employment creation are 
provided. A post-conflict development framework defines not only basic sector to be 
developed but also has to present solutions to challenges that ex-combatants face after the 
socio-economic reinstatement (Brown, 2005). It is advised that appropriate legal and 
regulatory frameworks connected to post-conflict business development frameworks should 
be encouraged. This will attract private sector initiatives and then growth in the local 
economy (Okojie, 2003).  
The private sector has to be given the role of monitoring and coordinating developmental 
projects, because in lots of post-conflict societies, private sectors bring the expertise, while 
government agencies suffer from a severe lack of capacity to support and deliver services to 
micro and small enterprises (White and Kenyon, 2000). Other post-conflict investors like 
businesses, local NGOs having experience in economic development projects and community 
groups should be welcomed to deliver business development services (BDS) (Brown, 2005).  
The private sectors and business development services should not overlook the existence of 
some rare local employment opportunities, rather they need to work together so as to enhance 
employment opportunities in a post-conflict situation.  
4.2.3. Employment in Existing Businesses 
It is a well known fact that the private sector has reservations about hiring ex-combatants 
who have limited skills (Bennett, 2002). The main task of reintegration programs is of re-
skilling unskilled people into a post-war torn community, wherein employment opportunities 
are scarce. It is up to the reintegration programs to identify some existing jobs and place for 
trained ex-combatants. Relocation of skilled war veterans in existing employment minimizes 
the risk of new micro-enterprise failure because of a lack in skills on the part of ex-fighters 
(www.unddr.org/iddrs/og; Chigunta and Mkandawire, 2002; Chigunta, 2005). This entails 
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that reintegration programs have the duty of raising the employment hope for ex-combatants, 
by schooling and giving them salary. 
Reintegration programs should, therefore, help raise available opportunities to ex-combatants 
by offering salary, schooling and equipment subsidies. For UN (2006), these subsidies 
however, should have the following conditions:  
 A limited salary given during a limited period;  
 Ex-combatants are not to be privileged than previous employed;  
 The ex-combatants salary should be used to increase their businesses, that is to say 
ex-combatants must have a permanent job;  
 Ex-combatants and other demobilized people or other vulnerable groups should be 
protected by labour rights making them out of abusive labour from the private sector. 
4.2.4. Micro-enterprise and Small Business Start-ups 
The development of businesses in a post-conflict society is just a theory but the reality on the 
ground remains something else. Foreign investors prefer to invest where there are both 
security guaranties and countries wherein economic policies favour to expansion of their 
workforce. It is, therefore, strongly advised that the development of private business which 
might have capacities to hire ex-combatants should be attracted. In case of existing 
businesses are worn out by the conflict, it is imperative to encourage and help ex-combatants 
to build their own micro-enterprise and start-up business plans and projects (UN, 2006; 
www.unddr.org/iddrs/og). This might not be an easy task for the reintegration programs, 
since managing a multiple member project is a difficult task. To overcome this latter 
impediment, reintegration programs should assure that all kinds of micro-enterprises are 
started and the distortion in the balance of supply and demand in local markets is avoided 
(Chigunta, 2006; UN, 2006; www.unddr.org/iddrs/og). 
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4.2.5. The Provision of Micro-grants 
Micro-enterprises need to be funded in a post-conflict situation. Arguing about how a micro-
enterprise should be financed, Chigunta (2006) states:  
“Financial support to create micro-enterprises should be micro-grants, which should be 
offered to the ex-combatants only after they have mapped a clear business planning, and 
should be allocated in instalments” (Harsch quoted by Chigunta, 2006: 2).  
Ex-combatants should be given allowances. These would include equipment, supplies and 
training on an incremental basis. This has proven to be the best way of assisting returnees 
rather than the cash instalments. Gradually instalments are more preferable in that they are 
easier to monitor and supervise than cash allowances. Cash payments generally end up being 
misused due to ex-combatants inexperience in new business set up (Chigunta, 2005; UN, 
2006; www.unddr.org/iddrs/og). The advantage of the Brown’s model is that it gives us 
different economic reintegration options that are appropriate to a post-conflict society. These 
boost job creation and skills development for ex-combatants (Brown, 2005). However, it fails 
to tell us the best viable option that corresponds to economic reintegration in response to the 
area’s realities. The next section unpacks viable economic reintegration options as applied to 
a few African post-conflict societies.  
4.3. Economic Reintegration Option for Ex-combatants 
The ex-combatants economic reintegration option depends on the capacities of local 
government to develop a clear national LED. The Public Works Projects as the engine of 
LED need to play the central role of coming up with an understanding economic reintegration 
plan drawn on the national resource capacities. Brown defines these capacities as being “the 
state of the economy in terms of demand for labour, business opportunities, and the 
availability of land and credit; and characteristics of the target population of ex-combatants in 
terms of education, skill levels, age, gender, entrepreneurial ability, and aspirations” (2005: 
4). The following Browns’ paradigm (Fig. 7) describes more than a few economic 
reintegration options that an ex-combatant might embark on once reintegrated into a civilian 
society. According to this framework, the main economic reintegration options are either to 
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undergo skills training after which one can find employment or to be self-employed. For 
Brown, self-employment involves agricultural work (farming) or operating a small (micro) 
business (Brown, 2005). Self-employment, in the form of farming and micro-businesses 
should be encouraged by aid organizations or host governments, as means to opening the way 
to the vital assimilation option that will be chosen by the returnee himself. Ex-combatants’ 
reintegration in micro-economic enterprises means that skills level, entrepreneurial ability, 
age, needs and aspirations should be assessed at the outset of the process, and must determine 
the available information on training and employment opportunities. This spells that the level 
of income that each employment option is perceived to generate is not to be overlooked 
(Brown, 2005).  
Figure 4:  Economic reintegration option for ex-combatants 
 
Source: Reintegration of Ex-Combatants through Micro-Enterprise: An Operational 
Framework (Brown, 2005). 
Although the above chart portrays different economic opportunities for an ex-combatant (Fig. 
7), the ex-combatant’s capacity to exploit these opportunities still remains questionable. On 
the one hand, ex-combatant’s reintegration depends on the country’s capacity to plan a local 
economic development capable of responding to post-conflict challenges. On the other hand, 
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however, cultural and environmental disparities from each country require that the 
reintegration program be differently adapted to each countries’ beliefs and realities (Chigunta 
and Mkandawire, 2002; Chigunta, 2005). Hence, deciding on ex-combatant’s economic 
reintegration option requires a strong analysis of labour market opportunity. These issues are 
addressed in the subsequent section. 
4.4. Viable Options 
From the Brown’s paradigm, it follows that several valuable lessons have to be taken into 
account when talking about the viability of economic reintegration through Public Works 
Projects. These lessons include: situation, needs and capabilities that ex-combatants need to 
embrace as they seek assimilation into civilian life. These viable options are described in the 
paragraphs below. 
4.4.1. Micro-Enterprise 
The feasibility of micro-enterprise as an economic reintegration for an ex-combatant is that 
micro-enterprise generates income both for those who cannot find wage-employment (which 
would provide a livelihood and are thus forced into self-employment) and also for those with 
genuine entrepreneurial aspirations to run their own businesses (Brown, 2005). It also 
generates additional job opportunities for other unemployed people in the community, by 
multiplying the benefits of the initial donor investment. Micro-enterprise gives rise to private 
sector development in a post-conflict national economy (Brown, 2005). Micro-enterprise 
offers a livelihood option in an environment where there are no opportunities for wage 
employment. Microenterprises can also reinforce other development programs, and vice 
versa. At the same time, microenterprise programs are likely to be more effective in raising 
ex-combatants’ incomes where rapid growth in the economy and in agricultural output, and 
better infrastructure, create a demand for the products and services provided by micro 
entrepreneurs. The following paragraphs try to draw a micro-enterprise program model for 
the economic reintegration of ex-combatants and a program design considerations specific to 
ex-combatants according to Brown framework (2005). 
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A Micro-Enterprise Programme Model for the Economic reintegration of ex-combatants 
 Assessment of conditions in country and selected area, needs profile of target group 
Survey of potential business opportunities and referral alternatives in the area (Brown, 
2005)  
 Selection of local NGO or government partners (to provide local knowledge, 
background check on applicants for loan/grant approval, and monitoring assistance) 
Program design and approval, public announcement of programme 
 Initial screening of applications, background checks with partner NGOs and cross 
checking with the military, to identify fraudulent applicants (care should be taken to 
eliminate personal bias in this screening process) 
 Interview of screened candidates, preliminary evaluation together with local 
community advisors, to check for reliability and to produce a first applicant profile  
 Conduct of aptitude tests, assessment of results: business skills, attitude to risk, and 
business experience. If insufficient score, refer applicant to skills training, temporary 
public works projects, local employment offices or local NGOs, using the inventory 
of referral alternatives developed above  
 Development of small business training curriculum (e.g. entrepreneurship, functions 
of management, types of businesses, accounting and taxation, marketing and business 
planning); training of a pool of small business advisors/trainers  
 Business planning for screened applicants: 
 Information sessions on local business opportunities 
 Business idea generation workshops, market research by applicants 
 Business training sessions 
 Preparation of business plans by applicants, assisted by business advisors 
 Assessment and Approval of Business Plan by a Selection Committee comprised of 
the Executing Agency, a Microfinance Institution or bank (if one is involved), the 
local NGO partner, and a representative of the community business advisory panel. 
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Selection criteria will include business viability, number of jobs created, guarantees 
available (if loan) and applicant’s reliability  
 Business Start-up and Operation 
 Monitoring and on-going business counselling/technical assistance 
 Loan repayment (if applicable)  
 A Micro-enterprise program design considerations specific to ex-       combatants 
 They are an economically vulnerable group, usually lacking education, marketable 
skills, material assets, and social networks  
 They are usually not in need of long term support, as they make good use of their 
discharge payments and settling-in packages  
 Support should thus be targeted to disadvantaged regions and groups first, e.g. 
females, child soldiers, and the disabled, as they have limited access to benefits and 
employment.  
 Female and disabled ex-combatants should have preferential access to skills training 
and capital  
 Child soldiers do not have the life-experience needed for microenterprise, but should 
have preferential access to vocational training and job placements  
 Some ex-combatants may have an entitlement mentality, based on the normative 
values adopted during combat. This could make them poor credit risks, although those 
held to the same standards as any other borrower group were observed to react well.  
 Lack of social acceptance of the individual by the receiving community may hinder 
his/her business prospects. 
4.4.2. Agriculture 
The viability of agriculture as an economic reintegration for returnees is that it may offer a 
means of securing a living even in the absence of a developed labour market (Chigunta, 
2005). However, the reintegration schemes in many countries failed to encourage viable 
agricultural reintegration, partly due to a reliance on choices made by ex-combatants (Harsch 
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quoted by Chigunta, 2006). The situation is further complicated by the issue of land 
ownership and inadequate access to land by ex-combatants.  
 Agriculture is an appropriate programme for ex-combatants' reintegration (Chigunta, 2005). 
Ex-combatants who have developed their business in agriculture are better off than those who 
are involving themselves in other sectors. This is due to the fact that agriculture ensures 
continued existence in situation where there is a shortage or lack of labour-market in a post-
conflict society (Harsch, 2005). Though ex-combatants trained in agriculture and farming 
perform well and fend for their livelihoods, agricultural programs are less attractive to ex-
combatants. In Sierra Leone for example, only 15 per cent of former soldiers chose the 
agricultural program and took up farming, while the rest of ex-combatants were disinterested 
in agriculture and the rural life (Harsch, 2005).   
4.4.3. Vocational Training 
Skills shortage generally impedes ex-combatant marketability and competitiveness on the 
labour market in a post-conflict period. To address this situation, reintegration programs 
provide ex-combatants with vocational education or training to allow them to make a living 
in the civilian economy (UN, 2006). For the UN, training erases ex-combatants’ combatant 
attitudes and behaviour, and builds up values and norms based on peace and democracy (UN, 
2006). Vocational training for an ex-combatant fits much better than formal education 
because it directly addresses ex-combatants’ basic concerns and is closely linked to the local 
labour-market which targets local economic potential and its business opportunities (UN, 
2006).   
Leading a research on vocational training and economic potential of a post-conflict society, 
Gera (2002) and Kapitsa (2002) provide that when dealing with labour market assessment in 
a post-conflict society the existing economic cultures ought to place meticulous attention on 
the issues of gender with particular attention on the existing economic culture, and ways in 
which the program can give the same chance to women and men to have equal access to all 
types of work by addressing gender inequality. Vocational training comes to revamp the 
opportunity of discovering ex-combatants latent practical skills that they might have never 
utilized in their life (UN, 2006). 
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4.4.4. Education and Scholarships 
Education and training for young ex-combatants in a post-conflict society should have a 
particular attention. Young people who are still under 15 have to be eligible for the formal 
education, and schooling. Bennett (2002) and Chigunta (2006) provided progressive ideas 
when they proposed extra support for teachers and trainers to manage the special needs of 
such learners. For them, teenager ex-combatants are to be allocated in the public schooling 
institutions, while those older than 20 years of age have to be beneficiaries of state assistance. 
The state assistance might be in the form of financial support in order that they finish their 
studies. This entails that when dealing with education of ex-combatants, the youth should be 
prioritized, and the attention should be placed on girls in particular (UN, 2006). 
United Nations’ stance on ex-combatants training and education in a post-conflict situation 
eloquently argues that the transformation of post-conflict agenda depends on the 
reconstruction of youth ex-combatants. Collectively the United Nations and other authors like 
Gera (2002) and Kapitsa (2002) provide deep insights into the problem of training and 
education of ex-combatants. School allowances budget should cover the total period of ex-
combatants ‘education. This period could be longer than the reintegration program, therefore, 
the financial planning of ex-combatants’ education should effectively target scarce resources 
and their availability, and identify potential support to the process in case the budget runs 
short (Kapitsa, 2002; UN, 2006). 
4.4.5. Apprenticeships and In-service Training 
The purpose of vocational training is to empower ex-combatants with new skills usable 
through apprenticeships or in-service training in existing businesses that might become more 
sustainable employment. In a post-conflict situation wherein a training program is expected 
to be undertaken, the opportunities for learning and training of former soldiers should be 
subsidized by paying the trainee an allowance. The local belief or tradition is a crucial asset 
to the success of apprenticeship and in-service training, for it ensures the programme 
sustainability (UN, 2006). The apprenticeship improves levels of general education which 
contributes substantially to the effectiveness of employer and private training and to project-
related training. It has also been shown to complement traditional apprenticeship in the 
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informal sector (Harsch, 2005). Apprenticeship has proven to be an excellent way of social 
reintegration and reconciliation, as it brings together returnees with other community’s 
members (Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005; UN, 2006). 
4.4.6. Life Skills 
The life skills can be related to the capabilities approach. The term “life skills” emerged 
about a decade ago in relation with the need to address what could help learners to cope with 
risks, decision making, emergency situations and survival strategies. Specific education 
modules were designed to train them in the ways to react when faced by such situations that 
they may encounter in their lives (UN, 2005). In this context, the “life skills” also addressed 
the request to foster the learners' personal development, to help them unfold their potential 
and enjoy an accomplished private, professional and social life. Finally, the concept of “life 
skills” was progressively associated with an education aiming at the acquisition of specific 
essential behaviours (UN, 2006).  
At the World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien in 1990, the importance of 
teaching skills that are particularly relevant to current life was raised (UN, 2005). Ten years 
later, in Dakar, a framework for action was adopted defining the four key pillars that are 
required to ensure a quality education in the long-term, namely: learning knowledge, learning 
to do, learning to be, and learning to live together (Ibid). The two last dimensions, learning to 
be and learning to live together, are the so-called “life-skills” since they deal with those 
important psycho-social capabilities that people need in order to live in harmony with others 
and to be able to master correctly their own lives.  
Within this framework, one can consider life skills as particular capabilities that should be 
reinforced, through the implementation of a suitable education policy, in the context of 
human development. They can be used to avoid the upsurge of serious conflicts, by 
improving attention to others and overcoming mental traumas due to social tensions and 
frustration. The provision of life skills is a necessary asset to ex-combatants and not a luxury. 
According to UN (2006), life skills training should not only include anger management 
classes, tutoring on appropriate civilian social behaviours and career planning, but should 
also extend towards other types of behaviour, like professional, social, political behaviour. 
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Life skills being a way of dealing with social behaviour and population participation in the 
social structure should complement other social training with regard to social rights and 
responsibilities. Ex-combatants, therefore, should be encouraged to participate to democratic 
structures in their new society (UN, 2006). 
4.5. Conclusion 
Labour-based Public Works Projects and public sector job creation play a crucial role in 
successful reintegration, by increasing ex-combatants’ chances to effectively participate in 
the labour market. The provision of business development services can address the non-
financial constraints faced by ex-combatants, such as lack of education, inadequate technical 
skills, poor access to markets, lack of information and unreliable infrastructure. Reintegration 
programmes can help to increase the opportunities available to ex-combatants by offering 
wage, training and equipment subsidies. The development of micro-enterprise start-up 
business plans should be undertaken by ex-combatants with the guidance and support of the 
DDR programme team. The main tool for funding the creation of micro-enterprises should be 
micro grants which, as recent experience indicates, should be disbursed to the ex-combatants 
only on the basis of a clearly established start-up business plan, and should be paid in 
installments. Successful economic reintegration is equivalent to the ex-combatants’ 
productive activities that render them responsible to hold their own livelihoods. That is to say 
returnees newly skilled are socio-economically self-reliant and contribute to the improvement 
of the post-conflict LED (Bennett, 2006).  
However, it is important to note that economic development and permanent job creation 
occur together. Measures to encourage LED should begin as soon as there are viable 
prospects for peace. Private sector initiatives should be actively promoted and assistance to 
micro and small enterprise development, small holder agriculture, cooperatives for farmers 
and other producers, and public-private partnerships is appropriate at all stages of post 
conflict recovery. Thus, the question arises of how can LED in Kivu happen along with 
permanent job creation in order to avoid the recurring weaknesses of the programme? This 
issue is addressed in the next chapter of the report which relates to planning prospective for 
the reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
PLANNING PROSPECTIVE FOR KIVU’S EX-COMBATANTS REINTEGRATION: 
TOWARDS A LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ENHANCEMENT 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Ex-combatants and victims alike often welcome the end of hostilities and are willing to “give 
peace a chance.” Peace negotiations and the post-peace agreement phase can be opportunities 
to implement political and labour market reforms that improve the status of previously 
disenfranchised groups. A more secure and equitable work environment can encourage public 
and private investment necessary for inclusive and risk reducing growth (Musila, 2009). Kivu 
having major natural resources required for a sustainable LED in a post-conflict context, 
Public Works Projects can particularly be important in leading the reintegration of ex-
combatants programs aimed at achieving local economic enhancement (UN system wide-
Policy, 2008). This chapter discusses a possibility of local economic development as a 
planning prospective for the reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu. In the first part, the 
discussion is based on the physical context of Kivu and how its geostrategic situation can 
influence the development of the region. In the second part, the chapter attempts to unpack 
the reintegration program as it takes place in Kivu, in comparison to other post-conflict 
societies and the last part of the chapter looks at how agriculture, small businesses and 
infrastructure renovation can be a successful model for the reintegration of ex-combatants 
and a way toward LED enhancement for the region.    
5.2. Context of the Study 
Kivu (230,510 sq km) is located in the Eastern part of Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC).  It is one of the richest mineral and agricultural regions. The Region shares its borders 
with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi on the East of the DRC and with Province Orientale, 
Kasai oriental and Katanga inside the country. Kivu region provides the country with coffee, 
cotton, rice and palm oil. Tin, gold are also produced in area. The diversity of Kivu mineral 
and agricultural resources generally is beset in the hands of various rebellions and guerrillas 
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launched from neighboring countries such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda (The Columbia 
Encyclopedia, 2004). Although the intervention of international organizations and Congolese 
government in demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating process in the DRC, the 
reintegration programme is far from finishing and did not reach the target (ISS, 2007; Takhur, 
2008).  
Figure 5: The Kivu map, showing neighboring countries and provinces 
 
                  
 
Source: Democratic Republic of Congo, 2009. Incidents sécuritaires contre les Humanitaires. 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
5.2.1. Administrative Context 
Up until 1986, Kivu was one single province. The region was then split to three different 
administrative entities or provinces, namely: Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu, and Maniema. Ostensibly 
Kivu’s subdivision was the first test towards decentralization system (Musila, 2009). In 
reality, the decentralization system as tested in Kivu, aimed to contain political tensions 
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between the leaders of different ethnic groups. However, despite this political subdivision, 
Kivu still remains a land of rivalries (Ndaywel, 1998; Musila, 2006). In general, the land’s 
rivalries in the Earstern part of the DRC and particularly in Kivu are one of the origin of 
internal conflicts (Baba Kaké and M'Bokolo, 1977). The endless politic and economic  
tensions between Nande and Banyarwanda ethnic groups in North Kivu, and in Sud-Kivu, 
between the Bashi and the Barega confirm the competitive environment between different 
ethnicities over the land mangement (Ndaywel, 1998). The Kivu’s economic anthropology 
revolves around land’s rivalries between these four main ethnic groups and their support 
networks (Baba Kaké and M'Bokolo, 1977). 
5.2.2. Physical Location 
Kivu belongs to the Great Lakes region. The region is well located, being at the intersection 
of trade routes that connect the Indian Ocean to South Sudan (Pourtier, 2003). This region 
has served as a meeting point between merchants from defferent cultural background 
(Renault, 1987). According to Roland Pourtier (2003), this region is well located where 
Francophone Central Africa meets East Africa, an Anglophone and Swahiliphone region 
looking out onto the Indian Ocean and the Arab world. Kivu lays in the drainage basin of two 
great rivers – the Congo and the Nile – the former flows towards the Atlantic, while the latter  
towards the Indian Ocean (Cros and Misser, 2006). Having a meeting point at Kisangani, 
Congo and Nile rivers fill the falls of lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu and Tanganyka which all 
run from North to South and serve as a natural border for the DRC with its Eastern 
neighbours, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania -all members of the East African 
Community- (EAC) along with Kenya (ibid). 
Initiative pour l’Afrique Centrale (INICA) and Laboratoire d’Analyse Régionale et 
d’Expertise Sociale (LARES)’ Survey on the Great Lakes Region depicts that the Kivu’s 
ecology is made up of  high lands. These high lands have advantages of having both tropical 
mountains and low temperatures. Tropical mountains and low temperatures contribute to a 
healthier environment that attracts tourism businesses, agricultural and farming activities 
(INICA and LARES, 2006). Kivu does not have tuberculosis and trypanosomiasis, known as 
tropical severe diseases (Musila, 2009). Additionally, the region has fertile volcanic soil 
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which offers to the region attractive arable lands (Cros and Misser, 2006). These privileges 
expose the region to better conditions for raising cattle, making the region’s high lands over 
time coveted by both farmers and cattle herders (ibid). This situation has given rise to areas 
of high demographic concentration, where the population density exceeds 330 inhabitants per 
square kilometer (hbts/km2) (Musila, 2009).  
5.2.3. Demographic Factors 
Since the 1990s, Kivu has faced  bloodshed civil wars with result being a very heterogeneous 
population and recurring migration,  as well as to omnipresent internal tensions between 
cattle herders and farmers (Mathieu and Mafikiri, 1998; Musila 2009). This situation has 
further been spoiled by the the unique and transformative nature of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide.  Kivu still hosts more than million Rwandan refugees and fugitives in its edging 
districts, whose presence gets worse its existing ethnic and land tensions (Musila, 2009). In 
1990s, the junction of pastures, arable land and high population in a restricted space created 
strong tensions linked to land ownership (Mathieu and Mafikiri, 1998). As this has been 
showed earlier, the land ownship issue is an ever-present conflict which lies at the heart of 
Kivu’s different communities. The land ownerships’ issue has also involved that of the 
natural resources (wood and minerals). Since 1990s, Kivu’s natural resources are linked to 
the international market, with result being the complexity conflict to the existing 
intercommunity tensions (Baba Kaké and M'Bokolo, 1977). Kivu’s conflicts arise over the 
control of coveted lands among a diverse population that has been unbalanced by massive 
migratory movements (Initiative pour l’Afrique centrale-INICA-and Laboratoire d’Analyse 
Régionale et d’Expertise Sociale-LARES, 2006). 
5.2.4. Rivalries over Land 
The land’s rivalries in Kivu are not only fuelled by the issue of land ownship, but also by the 
confusion caused by the coexistence of two methods of land management (Baba Kaké and 
M'Bokolo, 1977). The Congolese regulation pertaining to the land management links the 
ownership of the land to the state (land belongs to the state), which grants exploitation 
licenses. Traditional customs, however, entitle traditional chiefs to protect the land and 
bestow the land rights to the community or clan that cultivates it (Musila, 2009). Under this 
PLANNING FOR EX-COMBATANTS’ REINTEGRATION IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: 
LESSONS LEARNT FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES FOR KIVU IN THE DEMOCRATIQUE 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
62 
 
clash, the state always wins any land disputes. With result being, peasants are expropriated 
from their land rights, which entails their uncertainty and instability (ibid). Additionally, 
Kivu has two cultural conceptions of land totally divergent. The first cultural conception is 
that some ethnies define land as a tie between an ethnic group, a Mwami (the traditional 
authority) and a given area. According to this conception, access to land is directly linked to 
membership of a network of social relations which involve a duty of loyalty (tributes and 
tithes) and the provision of services. The second group, however, defines land as a value and 
can belong to individuals, free of personal ties or obligations. The second conception makes 
land, the farming and cattle herding rights which come with it, the object of personal desire 
(Mathieu and Mafikiri, 1998; Musila, 2009). Conflicts over land rights and the extension of 
territory have become fundamental components guaranteeing political and social 
emancipation (Musila, 2009). 
5.2.5. Kivu’s Economy 
The fundamental issue of Kivu’s economy is linked both to the market structure (Musila, 
2006; 2009) and the system of the communication networks between producers and 
consumers -between the countryside and the country’s cities- (Department for Planning and 
Urbanism, 2004). Basic infrastructure disruption and enormous security challenges caused by 
idle ex-combatants and armed groups are some post-conflicts’ legacy  that Kivu is still 
facing. Kivu’s economic infrastructure has completely broken down, or works poorly (ibid). 
In 2004, the DRC’s Research Department for Planning and Urbanism ( BEAU) described the 
DRC as being “torn” into three main “socio-economic and cultural zones” (BEAU, 2004):  
 A Western zone facing towards the Atlantic whose transport networks converge on 
Kinshasa and the port of Matadi;  
 An Eastern zone with no dominant city, but centered on the highlands, having almost 
no links to the capital Kinshasa and oriented towards the Indian Ocean;  
 A Southern zone focused on the DRC’s copper basin and its hinterland, oriented 
towards Southern Africa.  
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Kivu’s economy is disintegrated. The whole region’s economy is badly connected to the 
region’s cities and the rest of the DRC’s economy. This has been the result of the lack of 
reliable economic infrastructure. However, Kivu links to the national economy, in terms of 
goods imported and exported to and from the region (Musila, 2006). Kivu’s economy is 
divided into four geographical categories (Musila, 2009): 
 South West to North Route: This main route is totally busy with heavy air traffic 
carring minerals or palm oil between the main cities of the Eastern provinces. This is 
the heart of Kivu’s economy. This route links Goma’s international airport to Oriental 
Province and, is complemented by roads leading to Rwanda, Uganda and Southern 
Sudan, and is connected to Lubumbashi by rails. 
 Nord-Kivu – Sud-Kivu – Oriental Province –Kinshasa: This route has been the 
exclusively air-based route between Kivu and Kinshasa. The over 2000 km airline 
route was busy with supplying the capital with vegetables and meat from the large 
farms owned by airline companies. The years of war ( 1990s), followed by the 
collapse of the farms reduced the flow of goods. Since the official end of the war in 
2003, some airlines have restarted using this route to transport people as well as 
goods. To date, level of activities are nonetheless  less than those of the pre-war years. 
 The North-Kivu – South-Kivu Route: This economic route is dominated by water-
based traffic. It links Goma to Bukavu, respectively the capital of Noth Kivu and 
South Kivu. The goods are transported by boats and motorized canoes range from 
agricultural produce (beans from Rutshuru and Masisi) to imported manufactured 
goods, foods, pharmaceuticals and electronics. The road between the two cities is still 
in a good state, but its different segments are controlled by armed groups. 
 South-Kivu – Maniema Ties: This route is broken up into numerous segments and is 
being currently under refurbishment. From time to time it has been saved as a route of 
goods and minerals transportation.  
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As said earlier, Kivu is located in a middle of two rivers’ basin (Congo and Nile) and is in  
the heart of the Great Lakes Region. This geostrategic location makes the region well 
integrated with the East African economy and Swahili cultural zone (Cros and Misser, 2006). 
This economic and ecologic geostrategic position clearly exposes Kivu to a cross-border 
geopolitical situation (Ibid). Kivu is only connected to the West by air, while to the East, it 
has several possible connections at its disposal: air, water-based routes across the lakes, 
roads, and rail (Musila, 2009). The region has two international railway lines (the “Northern 
corridor” via Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya, and the “Central corridor” via Rwanda, Burundi 
and Tanzania ) these airrail lines link Kivu to the ports of Mombasa in Kenya and Dar-es-
Salaam in Tanzania (Ibid). INICA and LARES (2006) state that the daily traffic at border 
crossings allows trade density to be measured. Such crossings have been simplified by a 
series of trade accords signed by Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda within the framework of the 
Great Lakes Economic Community ( CEPGL) (Musila, 2009).  
Theoretically, Kivu has the economic potential that the region needs to be a post-conflict 
economic central hub of the DRC, however, the major handicap seems to be its geographic 
isolation caused by  the lack of conducive infrastructure and the insecurity of political 
instabilities and conflict (Musila, 2009). To date, while the decentralization issue is one stride 
towards the local economic development, policy favouring decentralization coupled with the 
reconstruction of the economy infrastructure can be able to solve these issues. Although Kivu 
theoritecally have resources that can enhance its LED, however, the last three civil strifes that 
have blown up in the region (1996: the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Congo [AFDL], 1998: the Congolese Rally for Democracy [RCD] and 2007: The National 
Congress for the Defence of the People [CNDP]) have shed light on the workings of this 
Eastern part of the DRC, in particular its local economic development and ex-
combatants’reintegration programme. Taking advantage of the fact that the DRC’s DDR 
programmes did not work properly, these conflicts have resulted in Kivu being an unrest 
region, disabled socio-economically, wherein local economic development and the ex-
combatants’ reintegration program are still not working out properly. The following section 
tries to analyse the reintegration programme as applied in Kivu. 
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 5.3. Kivu’s Reintegration 
In Kivu, UNICEF (2002) worked hand in hand with local authorities to structure and to 
develop programmes towards reintegrating ex-combatants back into civil society. UNICEF 
worked in conjuction with provincial authorities and local NGOs and implemented 
reintegration programmes in Goma (North Kivu), and Bukavu (South Kivu). The 
reintegration programmes, as undertaken by UNICEF, encopassed three phases. The first 
three-month phase involved ex-combatants’ psychological counseling and their participation 
in community building activities. The second six-month phase was designed to reintegrate 
ex-combatants into their families. At this stage,  the programme set to put ex-combatants with 
other care-givers as well as give them literacy and vocational training. Phase three, however,  
comprised close monitoring of the reintegration process, the continuation of counseling, and 
the provision of additional capacity-building training (UNICEF, 2002). 
Kivu’s reintegration programme aims at expanding access to education materials, training of 
teachers, rehabilitation of schools, increased participation of parents in school management, 
access to school meals, and enhanced opportunities for youth for vocational training and 
participation in community life (Boshoff, 2007; Takhur, 2008). The programme also 
promotes social and economic empowerment through increased access to skills and 
vocational training. Its particular focus is on women, youth and other vulnerable groups with 
expectancy being individual, household. Community incomes increase as a result of 
livelihoods and income-generating opportunities. This includes rapid-employment and micro-
enterprise activities and cash voucher / food for assets and training activities, on the one 
hand; and on the other hand, agricultural productivity and long-term food security promoted 
through support for food processing, alternative fuel and cooking methods, seed distribution, 
strengthening of agricultural production capacities, market rehabilitation and cash voucher / 
food for work schemes (Takhur, 2008). Moreover, increased local production and increased 
employment through the “Purchase for Progress” initiative to encourage improved 
agricultural practices, improved transport infrastructure and better access to markets 
(Boshoff, 2007; Takhur, 2008). With result being some child soldiers in Kivu and province 
oriental went through agricultural training as one of the reintegration components. Ex-
combatants from remote villages bordering the Bunia region have been trained in farming 
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techniques and received assistance instalments (a wheelbarrow and a watering can) to start up 
their own business (GTZ, 2005; ISS, 2007).  
On the ground, however, things do not look like they should be. Kivu still has a huge number 
of ex-combatants (ISS, 2007). CONADER established that 10,000 fighters still need to be 
demobilized in the Eastern of the DRC (Takhur, 2008). In Kivu, CONADER is working in 
partnership with some implementation stakeholders who sub-contract the work to a number 
of NGOs (Takhur, 2008). The continuing presence of armed groups shows that the 
disarmament and demobilization programme has been unsuccessful, and the reintegration of 
ex-combatants has not fully implemented (ibid). Research from Takhur devoted to Kivu’s 
reintegration depicts a lack of coordination and management on behalf of both national and 
international communities.  Takhur (2008) states that the problems that beset the DDR 
programme stem, on the one hand; from poor planning of reintegration programmes leading 
to poor technical, logistical and financial coordination and implementation and, on the other, 
from poor understanding and conceptualization of Kivu’s realities and, ex-combatants 
dynamics behaviour, not only by CONADER, but also by the reintegration programmes 
sponsors, including UNDP and World Bank. Kivu’s reintegration programme stakeholders 
pledged US$200 million towards the civilian component of the national DDR programme. 
This joint contribution from World Bank and donor community has never been totally 
released (Boshoff, 2007).  
Kivu’s reintegration budget being exhausted and international donors having not fully 
delivered their financial and material supports as pledged, many demobilized ex-combatants 
are still waiting to be reintegrated in Kivu (Takhur, 2008). The weakness and lack of strategy 
in the Kivu’s reintegration programme are also the fact that the reintegration programme 
drew away from the African experiences in the reintegration of ex-combatnts. The 
programme seems not to focus on the economic aspect of the ex-combatants and neither does 
it pave the way for the ex-combatants’ economy recovery. Critics such as GTZ (2005); 
Boshoff (2007) and Takhur (2008) among others have acknowledged that the reintegration 
programmes took place within conflict areas where ex-combatants were exposed to being re-
recruited by their former military groups and it was solely approached from a short-term 
security perspective by placing the focus solely on containing violence. Takhur (2008), 
PLANNING FOR EX-COMBATANTS’ REINTEGRATION IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: 
LESSONS LEARNT FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES FOR KIVU IN THE DEMOCRATIQUE 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
67 
 
however, emphsises that the Kivu’s DDR has been a complex process because it attempts to 
integrate security sector reform (SSR) with DDR, while the Kivu is still plagued by endemic 
violence, on the one hand, and on the other hand, reintegration has been an afterthought, with 
no focus on economic aspect based on Public Works Projects.  
In a discussion on planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants in a post-conflict situation, 
Kingma (1997) points out that the planning of the reintegration programme needs to involve 
all levels of government, especially the municipal and provincial levels. The highest levels of 
government have the most resources (financial and otherwise) but the least knowledge of the 
situation on the ground, while the lowest levels have the opposite strengths and weaknesses. 
Vertically integrating planning will allow constituencies at all levels of society to have ample 
opportunity to contribute to the reintegration process (Ibid). Although Kivu province and its 
municipalities were struggling to meet their reintegration mandate, the provincial level seems 
to be the weak link in the reintegration programmes (Boshoff, 2007).  
Despite DDR programme was put in place, planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants at 
the provincial sphere did not work out and most of the reintegration planning formulated 
were weak and not very strategic because local authorities were not given sufficient resource 
to deal with the reintegration issue, and the ex-combatants’ stance was overlooked in the 
reintegration planning (Craner, 2002; Anderlini, 2004). In addition, contrary to other war-torn 
countries’ experiences having dealt with the ex-combatants’ reintegration programmes, the 
Kivu experience further shows that there was still mistrust between ex-combatants and the 
local communities. Ex-combatants were afraid of leaving their armed groups, and the 
communities that would receive them were normally afraid to do so as well (UNICEF, 2002). 
Ex-combatants’ immediate families were often disadvantaged and thus, ill-prepared to 
receive and reintegrate ex-fighters. Moreover, the wider socio-economic support structures 
needed to reintegrate former soldiers back into civilian life were also largely non-existent 
(Ibid).  
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5.4. Learning from African Best Practices 
The diversity of reintegration experiences among countries is so great that drawing general 
lessons is hazardous. However, with the appropriate care, and always putting reintegration 
within the broader economic issues, one might draw some general lessons from the available 
research and other information on reintegration, particularly in Africa (Kingma, 97). 
When planning and implementing a reintegration programme, attention should be drawn on 
the transition of ex-combatants’ behaviour and the state of the post-conflict economy. Both 
elements are very crucial since they influence the transition from military to civilian life and 
the success or failure of ex-combatants’ economic reintegration. From different scenarios of 
Sub-Saharan African reintegration programmes as discussed above, it is evident that 
economic reintegration is closely linked to long-term post-war economic and social 
development plans (Harsch, 2005). However, it should not blind us of the potential failures of 
reintegration programmes, as this occurred in certain other countries.  
The well-orchestrated reintegration programmes in Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia and 
Rwanda is an example worth emulating. The Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia and Rwanda 
reintegration enabled the reconstruction of the local development in making ex-combatants 
proactive human resources. Again, the programmes emphasised on decentralized 
administrative structure which empowered different level of government to have exclusive 
functions. Given some weak institutional structures and other challenges that characterise the 
reintegration programmes, countries such as Mozambique and Namibia missed to strategise 
their reintegration planning. In Mozambique, ex-combatants did not have a reintegration 
programme. However, owing to an intellectual advantage, some ex-combatants have 
reintegrated themselves quite easily. This is the case of Mr. António Gaspar, ex-combatant 
from the Mozambican government army in the early 1990s.  Having a higher education, he 
was easily able to find a teaching position at the country’s Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (Harsch, 2005).  In Namibia, as discussed earlier, the reintegration 
planning was a patchwork of well-intended responses.  
Alien to Mozambican situation, in Angola, however, the Government reintegration 
programmes created an ex-combatants department which supported ex-combatants beyond 
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the term set with international granters. As stated earlier, more than 10, 5000 have been 
trained and assigned to the job (Mungoi, 1999). Ex-combatants found themselves hired in 
public sector under Public Works Projects initiated by the national government. The 
experience in both Liberia and Sierra Leone gave a picture of hope for sustainable ex-
combatants’ economic reintegration. This programme got a large number of ex-combatants 
having acquired livelihood. On the one hand, those who have been trained in farming and 
agriculture are still economically performing. On the other hand, it shows that without any 
significant access to micro-credit schemes and few job opportunities, the skills development 
training has lost its potential value to ex-combatants (Harsch, 2005; Chigunta, 2006), which 
made Liberian ex-combatants use their reintegration reimbursement to develop their own 
skills fit to the socio-economic realities. Harsch (2005: 3), for the purpose, provides that 
“many ex-combatants used their reintegration benefits to buy basic diamond, mining 
equipment, and prefer to settle in the mining district areas for diamonds. Others bought 
motorbikes and are running them on a commercial basis. Those who squandered all they were 
given are now in a deplorable and frustrating situation, with little or no hope. They believe 
that they did not achieve anything from the reintegration”.  
The Liberian reintegration programmes also revealed that about 40 per cent of ex-combatants 
desired to acquire skills by returning to school, whilst preferred a vocational training with 
auto mechanics being the most popular choice among men and tailoring among women 
(Harsch, 2005); while in Sierra Leone Harsch sees a hopeful note. He concurs with Green 
(2000) and Gera (2000) that tens of thousands of ex-combatants are already working as 
carpenters, cocoa farmers, small-scale traders and electricians. Though there are some notes 
of significant progress in Liberian and Sierra Leonean reintegration, in both countries, 
however, ex-combatants skilled in agriculture and farming have been overlooked during the 
distribution of lands (Harsch, 2005). In South Africa, the Expended Public Works 
Programmes succeeded to reintegrate freedom fighters. Ex-combatants got chance to achieve 
their studies, however, a gap between those who efficiently used their skills and those who 
failed to do so still exist (Mashike, 2002). Lesson from South African reintegration depict 
that the concept of ideology, when designing a reintegration plan, should be well handled. 
Most rebellions used Marxist-Leninist ideology, in order to instil in the mind of fighters the 
PLANNING FOR EX-COMBATANTS’ REINTEGRATION IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: 
LESSONS LEARNT FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES FOR KIVU IN THE DEMOCRATIQUE 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
70 
 
concept of social equality. Currently, global neo-liberalism is the master word on the market; 
as such reintegration risks a failure because ideological discrepancies that exists between 
Neo-liberalism and Marxism. As stated by Mungoi (1999) when looking at the South African 
post-conflict society, He argues that the implementation of reintegration under neo-liberal 
hegemony is not adequate. South Africa led an urban reintegration not properly planned and 
implemented, leaving behind complaints among former freedom fighters. 
In sight of the broad-based lessons from the above review, one can say that a reintegration 
plan should extend over a realistic period of time for reconstruction. It will then, be the 
principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning, budgeting, 
management and decision-making processes. In short, reintegration programme consists in 
alleviating ex-combatants’ poverty and is a window towards the improvement of the post-
conflict LED.  
5.5. Discussion and Critical Assessment 
As a poverty alleviation process and an economic recovery, the reintegration programme is a 
joint effort by governments and international agencies. The international review shows that 
the success of the reintegration programmes depends on the decentralization degree and the 
efficient use of the public means through Public Works Projects (and/or development and 
socio-economic projects) which provide former combatants with the means to more desirable 
productive work in line with what is realistic given market conditions and manage their 
expectations of what is realistically available in the market. Put simply, from the African 
experiences, economic reintegration means:  
 Tailoring interventions in response to the detailed socio-economic needs assessments 
of ex-combatants and receiving communities;  
 Building upon the existing self-help livelihood strategies of local communities;  
 Building participation, transparency and accountability in the design, implementation 
and evaluation of programmes;  
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 Building capacity of government to assume long-term responsibility of local 
development processes.  
Against to the international review, Kivu’s reintegration describes that there are still many 
holes in the understanding of economic reintegration. Although reintegration programme has 
emerged in Kivu in recent years, the prevalence of unresolved questions about key aspects of 
economic reintegration suggests that current DDR practices have significant room for 
improvement (Takhur, 2008). Kivu’s unresolved issues of key aspects of economic 
reintegration are:  
 Lack of employment actually leads to the resumption of war  
 Uncertain right balance of skills training and capital infusions for getting former 
combatants back to work  
 Community-driven recovery programmes actually do not lead to improved economic 
or social outcomes for former combatants  
 Lack of the criteria by which to determine the most appropriate balance between 
individual and community based targeting for economic reintegration  
 Unintended effects of DDR programmes on the broader economy 
 Programmes are not coordinated with longer term development planning.  
Experiences from African post-conflict countries show that the micro-enterprises approach is 
deployed usefully to support the economic reintegration of ex-combatants in a post-conflict 
situation. Having a significant success in contributing to economic growth, social stability 
and equity, the sector is one of the most important vehicles through which low-income people 
can escape poverty (Brown, 2005; Nilsson, 2005). With limited skills and education to 
compete for formal sector jobs, ex-combatants find economic opportunities in micro-
enterprise as business owners and employees (Brown, 2005). As it is mentioned earlier, the 
success of reintegration programme in Sub-Saharan African post-conflict societies draws on 
provisions for absorbing ex-combatants into restructured lucrative conditions. In countries 
like Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, to name a few, ex-
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combatants’ economic reintegration was led through either Public Works Projects or socio-
economic (developmental) projects, which assisted ex-combatants with limited education and 
few skills to be employed through different developmental projects like agriculture, farming, 
carpeting, sewing, masonry (Chigunta, 2006).  
The reintegration as a socio-economic process through which an ex-combatant switches to 
civilian life (Harsch, 2005), its full success is equivalent to the ex-combatants’ productive 
activities that render them responsible of their livelihoods (Bennett, 2006). As seen in other 
post-conflict societies, the success of ex-combatants reintegration relies on intensive 
agricultural skills training, conflict resolution skills and experience, literacy and numeracy 
training. Economic reintegration, as happened in some Sub-Saharan African countries has 
provided ex-combatants with financial autonomy through employment (Ibid). Different 
initiatives have catered to the special needs of disabled veterans who cannot reintegrate into 
the labor force, for rural settlers, and for urban settlers (Harsch, 2005). Common economic 
reintegration programmes include education and professional training, public employment, 
encouragement of private initiative through skills development and microcredit support, and 
access to land have been done (Bennett, 2006; Chigunta, 2006). As Harsch (2005) would 
point out, for the reintegration to be more functional and productive within a given area, 
Public Works Projects need to plan and set a training programme based on agricultural and 
small enterprises reintegration for ex-combatants and community members. For him, training 
being a reintegration tool is generally provided to ex-combatants and community’s members 
as a means towards LED (Harsch, 2005). 
From the above consideration, it follows that Kivu's formal economy is dominated by the 
agriculture, small businesses, livestock, fisheries and mining sectors. Agriculture is basically 
practiced in the villages, and for subsistence. It provides with major sources of income 
(65%), small businesses (20%), Livestock (10%) and fisheries (5%) (Alin, 2002).  The major 
crops are cassava, rice and sweet potatoes and the main cash crops include coffee, palm oil, 
rubber, cotton, sugar, tea, and cocoa. Food crops include cassava, plantains, maize, 
groundnuts, and rice (Ibid). Though agriculture is the mainstay of the region, commercial 
agricultural production, however, remains limited, with many producers engaged in 
subsistence food production. Mineral sector, however, accounts for the vast majority of 
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Kivu’s exports and represent the single largest source of foreign direct investment (Alin, 
2002).  
Planning for a Kivu’s ex-combatants reintegration as a path towards the local economic 
development means that appropriate economy recovery plan and poverty alleviation 
framework for Kivu’s ex-combatants should simultaneously address central problems facing 
ex-combatants and local communities in the post-conflict society, namely growing 
unemployment (Gera, 2000). This means that Kivu’s DDR planning through development 
projects under Public Works Projects should draw on a new local developmental framework 
based on local capacities (Takhur, 2008). Under this framework, Public Works Projects have 
to go a long way towards ensuring direct and sustainable poverty alleviation and 
strengthening capacities for ex-combatants self-reliance. For this to be effective, this research 
proposes  a reintegration programme through Public Works Projects with some viable options 
like agriculture, small businesses and infrastructure as sectors to be taken into account.  
5.6. Viable Options for Kivu’s Ex-combatants Reintegration 
Brown’s paradigm as set earlier offers a reintegration framework that Kivu’s programme can 
draw on.  According to the paradigm, the Kivu’s reintegration programmes through Public 
Works Projects need to make use of local opportunities such as agriculture, small business 
and infrastructure. 
5.6.1. Agriculture 
Agriculture provides Kivu with 65% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Alin, 2002). This 
means that the region’s main economic activity is the agricultural production. Thus, Kivu’s 
reintegration could be based on the agricultural aspect. Based on the prior discussion on 
availability of land capacity in Kivu, ex-combatants’ reintegration through agriculture is 
feasible and could be planned under agricultural pilot training centres. Reintegration through 
agriculture under agricultural pilot training centres implies all ex-combatants and the 
demobilized soldiers drifted toward the cities altogether to be reintegrated into the socio-
economic mainstream. This means that by setting up the agricultural pilot training centres, 
Public Works Projects will reintegrate ex-combatants through agricultural activities, with aim 
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being expended skills development and job creation, and the boost of local economic 
development for the whole community. Under this frame work, ex-combatants are no longer 
fighters or destructors but the Builders of the Nation in being economically productive. This 
means that ex-combatants who were initially receiving installment will no longer get any 
payment, but have to live off their own agricultural, farming or livestock produce. The 
agricultural pilot training centres will be a skilling centre where 2,000 ex-combatants are 
supposed to be trained in agriculture, farming and livestock.  
As stated earlier, 10,000 ex-fighters are still waiting for their reintegration in Kivu (Takhur, 
2008). Ex-combatants’ reintegration through agriculture, planned under agricultural pilot 
training centers gives the opportunity of absorbing more than 10,000 ex-combatants with 
only five pilot training centers settled in the region. Furthermore, agricultural pilot training 
centres will create more jobs for the whole community, increasing crops’ production and 
local income. They will, therefore, pave the way for the enhancement of LED. The 
agricultural pilot training centres are one of the powerful structure under which Public Works 
Projects should plan the reintegration of Kivu’s ex-combatants in the context of LED.  
5.6.2. Small Businesses 
In the DRC, opportunities for wage employment in the formal sector of the economy are 
extremely limited, and the vast majority of poor people rely on self-employment for their 
livelihood. Kivu being manly an agricultural province, microenterprises can play an 
important role in poverty reduction and in economic and social development more generally. 
Microenterprises can therefore contribute significantly to increasing the productivity of self-
employment in the informal sector of the local economy in Kivu. It may also enable ex-
combatants skilled in agriculture and other small businesses, and marginal farmers to 
purchase the inputs they need to increase their productivity. Small businesses as well as 
finance a range of activities adding value to agricultural output. In an environment, like Kivu 
region, where economic growth is occurring, microenterprises also have the capacity to 
transmit the benefits of growth and/or external injections more rapidly and more equitably 
throughout the community. 
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Small enterprises provide 20% of Kivu’s GDP (Alin, 2002). This means that the reintegration 
of Kivu’s ex-combatants through small enterprises will provide basis to start local small 
business as well as to expand existing Kivu’s businesses, either owned by the ex-combatants 
or in partnership with other small entrepreneurs. Reintegrating Kivu’s ex-combatants through 
small businesses implies training courses, implemented with the support of small 
entrepreneurs willing to hire and train the ex-combatants. Training will skill ex-combatants in 
garment-making (tailoring), carpentry, mechanics, masonry, small-scale trade, electricity etc. 
Ex-combatants skilled in small enterprises will contribute in providing market tools and 
power necessary for local job creation and boost Kivu’s LED. It follows that after a few 
months of activities, ex-combatants will be able to hold their own small shops, taverns, shoe 
repairing, design studios. Reintegrating ex-combatants through small enterprises brings to 
Kivu the vision of the Regional Programme for Economic Development and Regional 
Integration in transforming the region into a space of shared growth and development, a 
space of cooperation based on strategies and policies of convergence.   
5.6.3. Infrastructure 
Only half of the roads from Bukavu to Kindu are currently being renovated by the Chinese. 
The underlining problem of Kivu’s economy is also linked to its failed infrastructure (Musila, 
2009). Kivu’s infrastructure has completely broken down. This is the most handicaps of 
Kivu’s economic roads in terms of connections and trade (Ibid). To date, the lack of roads 
means that traffic between Kivu’s cities (all dotted along the frontier) and their hinterlands is 
negligible. To reach Bukavu from Uvira (in South-Kivu), transporters prefer to cross the 
Congo-Rwanda border twice, as the roads are of a better quality on the Rwanda side (Musila, 
2009).  
As for the exportation of agricultural produce, it is not guaranteed in such conditions. 
Sometimes it even becomes impossible when security conditions worsen. Reintegration 
programme through infrastructure renovation means Public Works Projects should plan 
infrastructure innovation’s works in Kivu which should absorb ex-combatants as workforce. 
This will create suitable jobs for ex-combatants who would like to involve in infrastructure 
refurbishment rather than in agriculture or small-businesses. Furthermore, reintegrating ex-
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combatants through infrastructure innovation will cost much cheaper in using a local 
workforce. Kivu is also a mining region. This implies that Public Works Projects can plan an 
ex-combatants’ reintegration programme based on mining skills. However, as seen in 
previous discussion, reintegrating ex-combatants through mining does not work well (Global 
Witness, 2009).  
5.7. Conclusion 
Over the last two decades, rebuilding war-torn societies has been in the centre of post-conflict 
society planning. The link between local economic development and economic reintegration 
in a post-conflict reconstruction raises the concern of planning a sustainable post-conflict 
development that alleviates the risk of a renewed outbreak of conflict and unrest. This chapter 
was aimed at tying economic reintegration to local economic development in Kivu post-
conflict society. Discussion surrounding Kivu’s prospective planning for ex-combatants 
reintegration has depicted that the successful reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu relies on 
agricultural, small-enterprises and infrastructure reconstruction through Public Works 
Projects. This is the approach that the local, provincial and national governments should have 
grasped in reframing a new, strong and sustainable ex-combatant reintegration framework, 
grounded in trustful coordination between different stakeholders. Therefore, the reintegration 
through agricultural projects based on the settlements of agricultural training pilot centres, 
infrastructure renovation and micro-enterprise models strongly appear to be a sustainable 
economic reintegration approaches for the reintegration of  ex-combatants. Furthermore the 
consolidation of LED planning for Kivu, by taking into account all physical and geographical 
opportunities that the post-conflict society is offering. Kivu’s infrastructure being currently in 
refurbishment state, this had to be supportive for ex-combatants, however, the sector is using 
the Chinese as workforce. Moreover, the period of war in Kivu shows that the DRC has fallen 
victim to rebels who use revenue from minerals such as coltan and cassiterite to purchase 
arms and fuel for the conflict (Global Witness, 2009:1). Mineral resources being at the heart 
of the Kivu’s conflicts, therefore, reintegrating ex-combatants through mining seem very 
hazardous for the post-conflict community.  
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CHAPTER 6:  
A WAY INTO THE FUTURE 
 
6.1. Introduction 
After studying the conditions in Kivu and the different ways that can be part of the re-
integration options, with LED and Public Works Projects making up some of these strategies, 
the research attempted to answer the question: What other courses of action can be taken to 
have a strong and reliable reintegration programme for Kivu province? 
Planning has a history of common debates about thoughts and practices. These common 
debates have entrenched a critical concern for the development of human and environmental 
well-being, mainly as pursued through interventions which seek to shape environmental 
conditions and place qualities (Morino, 2005).  
6.2. Ex-combatants’ Reintegration: A Planning Issue 
Analysis of planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants leads to the issue about planning 
models and planners’ roles in a post-conflict society. This concern, in turn raises issues of 
ethics and values, issues that cannot be divorced from socio-economic context in which ex-
combatants’ reintegration planning takes place. “Planning as a method of making rational 
decision, a method that is, to some extent, common to many areas in this perspective, is 
essentially oriented toward optimization that achieves the best possible result within given 
constraints, with regard to the objectives undertaken” (Archibugi, 2003: 156).  
Having conducted this research, the analysis takes as its starting point the validity of selective 
African post-war societies, which was the foundation for the Kivu’s case study. As the 
emerging literature regarding the post-conflict societies and reconstruction suggests,  when 
ex-combatants are demobilized and therefore, released into civilian society, the community is 
faced with socio-economic challenges that relate to post-war rebuilding, namely economic 
disruption, ex-combatants phenomenon and disintegrated society (Colletta, et al., 1996; 1997; 
Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005; Chigunta, 2005). To deal with these challenges, donors have 
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developed the reintegration programmes as a planning theory aiming at the economic, 
political and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civilian society 
(Lundin, 1998; Brown, 2005; Nilsson, 2005).  
Countries like the DRC, the reintegration programme can only be successful if the role and 
purpose of the programme is clearly articulated. As this research has indicated, planning for 
Kivu’s reintegration programme will depend on the way different stakeholders interact with 
provincial authorities within a cooperative structure. As in the case of Sub-Saharan African 
countries, the Kivu’s reintegration programme is in dire of coordination and harmonisation 
between and within all stakeholders. The reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu has to draw 
on experiences from other war-affected countries. Dialogue between different social groups 
involved in LED will contribute to the socio-economic cohesion.  
6.3. Decentralisation:  A Path towards Kivu’s Sustainable Local Economic Development 
The purpose of consultations between different social groups is to come to a common and 
shared vision on the economic development of the territory that is based on the territorial 
diagnosis, sensitizing, creating a forum, designing a Local Economic Development strategy 
and establishing coordination/implementation structures (Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005; UN, 
2006). For this to happen, a decentralisation which offers to local officials the power to be 
more active than the central government authorities is necessary. Decentralised 
administrative system will empower local officials to be more dedicated and successful 
promoters of economic reintegration and LED than central government authorities. 
Decentralisation will generally be considered desirable in itself as a democracy-enhancing 
undertaking (Kenneth, 2006; Blackely and Bradshaw, 2002). In this regard, the 
implementation of the Kivu’s reintegration programme will be piloted by a strategic and 
systemic approach which encompasses a provincial or national structure such as Public 
Works Projects for its execution. It should aim at countrywide coverage within a definite time 
horizon and according to a strategic expansion plan.  
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6.4. Public Works Projects: An Engine for Kivu’s Ex-combatants’ Reintegration and 
Local Economic Development  
As this has been tested in other post-conflict societies, Public Works Projects have been 
supportive of ex-combatants’ poverty alleviation initiatives and can play the same role in 
Kivu’s situation. The rationale behind Public Works Projects in reintegrating ex-combatants 
through agriculture is that Public Works Projects can work together with other sectors to 
produce faster growth, reduce poverty, and sustain the environment. As an economic activity, 
economic reintegration through agriculture, small-businesses and infrastructure refurbishment 
under Public Works Projects is a source of growth for the local and national economy, and 
provides the post-conflict society with the private investment opportunities. This sounds very 
important for Kivu for agricultural production constitutes food security because it is a source 
of income for the ex-combatants.  
Agricultural pilot training centres as discussed earlier can draw on the National Service 
framework as settled in Kaniama Kasese (Katanga province) in 1998. However, care should 
be taken to direct the projects away from military skills as ex-combatants’ attitudes have to 
be shifted from war to the application of developmental skills. Small enterprises in the Kivu’s 
informal economic sector will benefit ex-combatants. In running commercial and other 
trading activities, ex-combatants will partake actively in the circular movement of the 
informal sector activities. Entrepreneurial conditions should be promoted among the ex-
combatants so that they can feel and have a sense of belonging into the society that they can 
fully be functional. Micro-enterprises creation can be supported by set-up grants or loans, 
skills training and business coaching (Yusuf and Schindehutte, 2000).  
Micro-enterprises bring to ex-combatants access to savings facilities that also plays a key part 
in enabling them to smooth their consumption expenditures, and in financing investments 
which improve productivity in agriculture and other economic activities. To safe guard 
against misuse ex-combatants are encouraged to design their own business plan. Grants 
become a more suitable way of providing start-up assets when ex-combatants are themselves 
genitors and authors of their micro-enterprises plan. However, ex-combatants should avoid 
being granted micro-finance as these programmes are volatile (Bennett, 2006; UN, 2006).  
PLANNING FOR EX-COMBATANTS’ REINTEGRATION IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: 
LESSONS LEARNT FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES FOR KIVU IN THE DEMOCRATIQUE 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
80 
 
Infrastructure renovation regenerates sustainable employment opportunities. Ex-combatants 
who cannot be involved in agricultural production or small businesses can work as manual 
labours or in road maintenance. However, the regeneration processes are mostly overseen by 
Chinese companies using Chinese labour force, while the projects were supposed to be 
catalysts in reincorporating ex-combatants.  
Public Works Projects through agriculture and small businesses projects will address not only 
the ex-combatants’ economic reintegration but also LED. Far ahead, Kivu’s economic 
infrastructure being disrupted during the unrest period, Public Work Projects creates 
sustainable jobs for ex-combatants and economically paves the way for LED. Providing 
economic reintegration support for Kivu’s ex-combatants is critical in order to help develop 
alternatives to violence-based livelihoods. For this to be effective, CONADER, 
MONUSCO/MONUC, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Kivu’s local 
entrepreneurs and other developmental agencies like United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), USAID, UNICEF need to sit together and analyse the feasibility of 
Kivu’s reintegration programme through Public Works Projects.  CONADER, as the 
government representative, has to provide with arable land wherein training pilot centers 
should be settled. MONUSCO/MONUSCO needs to advocate for financial assistance to the 
United Nations partners for the programme to be sustained. FAO should amass agricultural 
expertise and equipments, enhance innovation within their speciality. Influential 
organizations and leaders should advocate and convince the local communities to welcome 
the programme. Input from international organizations, local entrepreneurs and other 
stakeholders should be given a platform to state their view about the programme as this 
contribute to LED.  
6.5. Reintegration: A Local and National Issue 
Though reintegration process is an international concern, its planning and implementation, 
however, should be a national issue. A national reintegration programme should not utterly 
rely on the international financial assistance. International support being assorted of many 
conditions depends on the will of state contributors. In such a case, the national government 
should draw its own financial budget for reintegration programme to undertake its 
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reintegration programme whether the promised money is delayed by stakeholders (Takhur, 
2008). 
The analysis of labour market needs to be regularly updated during the implementation of the 
reintegration programmes and should include analysis of training, vocational education and 
provision of business development services (UN, 2006; 2008; UNHCR, 2007). This would 
entail a special re-skilling curriculum that would specifically be tailored to ex-combatants 
that aims to see “ex-combatants as a workforce” for their own LED (Colletta, et al., 1996). 
Training should be tailored to fit the profile of ex-combatants. Trainers have to bear in mind 
that most jobs will be in the informal sector. Therefore, the contents and methodologies of 
training should respond to basic needs of trainees making them feel confident (Mashike, 
2000). Ex-combatants’ training and education  can become a part of a national vocational 
programme, not only provided to people having taken up arms but also to those who missed 
the opportunity to attend formal classes during their schooling age (UN, 2006). However, 
training should not be confused with formal education that should be provided to younger ex-
combatants, on the one hand, and on the other, the use of training should not overlook 
vocational education which is a type of informal education suitable to ex-combatants. 
Training will include not only non-violent conflict resolution, civilian social assessment, and 
career planning, but also understanding what employers expect in terms of assessment 
package, focus on youth, girls and women, limitations of training, practical application as 
well as cultural considerations (Colletta, et al., 1996; 1997; Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005).  
Kivu’s ex-combatants reintegration planning needs to focus on the overall systems 
framework, whereby all the segments play a crucial and equal role and whereby all the issues 
of LED and Public Works Projects are regarded as dynamic and treated as interconnected. 
This means that the reintegration programme should draw attention on the importance of 
innovation (jobs creation), skills developments or knowledge creation and proactive 
strategies for achieving a competitive post-conflict society (Chigunta, 2006).  
6.6. Kivu’s Reintegration: A Learning Experience 
What emerges from this research is that achieving a Kivu’s ex-combatants reintegration is 
very difficult without a holistic approach to LED planning through Public Works Projects 
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and, systemic and strategic thinking. Hence, Kivu’s reintegration planning should be seen as 
an ongoing process, which involves learning by reflecting and acting. It is important to take 
time to stand back, think and learn from other African reintegration experiences. A successful 
Kivu’s ex-combatants reintegration shall involve a capacity assessment based on human, 
social, natural, physical economic and spiritual assets. The strength of reintegration 
programme must come out of what ex-combatants say, want and not from assumptions that 
stakeholders make sometimes, for the needs are not immediately clear or cannot be easily 
understood. By interacting with one other,   ex-combatants and  reintegration programme 
leaders and stakeholders  will be able to understand how problems affect people differently, 
circumstances change, and needs assessment give people an opportunity to prioritize their 
needs, which lead to a more sustainable development project. 
6.7. Planning for Ex-combatants’ Reintegration: A Way Forward  
Planning is a scheme, programme or method worked out beforehand for the accomplishment 
of a socio-economic objective (Faludi, 1973; Healey, 1991; Archibugi, 2003; Morino, 2005; 
Hillier and Healey, 2008). This means that to be consistent and effective a planning system 
must refer not only to the socio-economic purpose of its reason being, but also to the vision 
of a developmental idea of the local community that it is for (Morino, 2005). This entails the 
approach of public participation in a planning system. Since local communities are no longer 
spoon-fed their needs but become part of the process of making sure that their needs are met.  
The reintegration planning is influenced by post conflict reconstruction policies and planning 
process. The principal systemic and strategic planning instrument which guides and informs 
all planning, budgeting, management and decision-making processes in Kivu is to be a local 
and national vision. Therefore, it will supersede all other plans that did not fit in Kivu’s 
reintegration programme. The new Kivu’s reintegration programme must introduce measures 
to prevent and resolve a series of complex socio-economic problems, not only affecting the 
demobilized soldiers but also their families. Opportunities for income generation and 
employment should be offered to the demobilized soldiers with the same conditions as those 
applying to the receiving community, in order to avoid segregation. To materialize this 
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vision, some best practices are critical to the success of the LED and economic reintegration 
of ex-combatant in Kivu: 
 A good understanding of the prevailing local economic conditions 
 Initiating and expending Public Works Projects as a vehicle of LED 
 Conducting a socio-economic profile of ex-combatants 
 Carrying out a needs assessment of ex-combatants 
 Basing job creation schemes on the local situation 
 Providing skills training relevant to the local situation, 
 Transforming the militarist mentality of ex-combatants  
 Carefully designed credit schemes 
 Focusing on broader community empowerment, and 
 Undertaking wider efforts aimed at economic recovery and political reconciliation.  
As discussed earlier, planning for ex-combatants’ reintegration through Public Works 
Projects shall enhance Kivu’s LED and will have two comparative advantages: 
 Its capacity to contextualize labour markets and employment issues within local 
economies  
 Its use of area-based, participatory planning methods, which encourage dialogue and 
participation, as well as ensure the relevance of intervention. 
Kivu’s LED process and its planning modalities will involve the application of a set of 
assessments aimed at profiling the territorial capital and detecting challenges and 
opportunities for economic recovery. These assessments will be designed to inform the 
identification of measures targeting both the demand and the supply side of labour market. 
This will make LED approach particularly suitable to achieve a sustainable reintegration in 
Kivu. Effectively, measures on the supply side alone do not produce lasting results and have 
to be combined with initiatives aimed at expanding business opportunities and creating jobs. 
Kivu’s LED stakeholder groups and forums will be useful platforms to decrease tension and 
promote reconciliation among antagonistic groups. LED stakeholders will apply structures 
for decision making, where contribution and consensus-building will be facilitated by neutral 
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actors. Decisions taken jointly and projects identified and implemented in a collaborative way 
will be tangible outcomes. These outcomes will provide a dialogue that is valuable, 
constructive and an alternative to violence. Therefore, there will be two different modalities 
of applying LED in combination with reintegration programmes for ex-combatants in Kivu 
depending on these scenarios: 
 LED will be envisaged in a setting when a reintegration programme is already 
running ( This is the current case in Kivu)  
 An LED programme pre-exists to the establishment of ex-combatants’ reintegration 
programmes. 
To conclude, we can argue that strategic and systemic partnerships forged between 
government, private sector and civil society is critical to successful planning for the 
reintegration of ex-combatants and LED in Kivu. Government has to take the lead in 
providing the framework plan for reintegration programme and post-conflict’s LED 
reconstruction. Private sector leadership is the key to economic growth and development. It is 
important that the reconstruction effort, being as vast as it is politically complex, takes into 
account the input of key private sector institutions as well as the participation of indigenous 
businesses. Because post-conflict government in Kivu lacks the financial and skill bases for a 
dominant role in the economy, its role in reconstruction must be small and selective. Kivu’s 
domestic private sector is inherently weak and fragile and so contributes only marginally to 
reconstruction efforts. Kivu’s provincial government has to embark on economic reforms that 
would attract foreign direct investment. 
Reintegration is more than a process through which ex-combatants are demilitarized by 
severing ties with their combatant lives. Rather, it is a process of strengthening links between 
ex-combatants and their communities. Several strategies have been recommended, however it 
should be borne in mind that their implementation is no substitute for a comprehensive and 
well planned DDR process: reintegration has not succeeded within a flawed economic 
context. There is much more to research that needs to be undertaken on this topic. 
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